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ABSTRACT 
The risk of a nuclear attack by terrorists is one of the most urgent and threatening 
dangers facing the U.S.  The U.S. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
Destruction depicts a layered system of preventive measures ranging from securing 
materials at foreign sources to interdicting weapons or nuclear materials at ports, border 
crossings, and within the U.S.  Several departments within the U.S. government manage 
these preventive programs with little cross-departmental integration to determine where 
additional funds could provide the greatest impact.  Furthermore, no governmental office 
with budgetary or staffing authority exists to direct the overarching effects of these 
programs and expenditures as a whole. 
This study examines the fiscal prioritization and relative effectiveness of the 
primary U.S. programs to prevent acts of nuclear terrorism contrasted against the threat 
of a terrorist nuclear attack within the U.S.  This effort seeks to bridge departmental lanes 
of responsibility, provide a holistic perspective, and identify programs in need of 
additional resources and emphasis, as well as efforts that offer comparatively little added 
security.  This research concludes that while proactive domestic and overseas source 
security measures receive appropriate fiscal emphasis, border and cargo security 
measures and the supporting research and development efforts do not. 
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A nuclear bomb in the hands of terrorists poses a grave risk in terms of their 
unpredictable willingness to use it and its capacity to cause massive destruction in a 
single instant.  Concern also resonates that terrorists might use a nuclear bomb to 
destabilize international security or gain valuable leverage in the pursuit of political 
objectives.1  Furthermore, the use or substantiated threat of such a weapon would likely 
escalate anti-terrorism expenditures that have already grown beyond sustainable levels.2  
Accordingly, many experts view the threat of a terrorist nuclear attack as one of the most 
urgent issues facing the Obama Administration.3 
Prominent political figures within the U.S. government and numerous scholars 
depict the threat of a terrorist nuclear attack as grave, immediate, and one of the nation’s 
highest defensive priorities.4  Consequently, the threat of a terrorist nuclear attack elicits 
significant public and political concern.  The U.S. government faces the challenge of 
composing strategies and policies responsive to this threat but not solely predicated on its 
potential consequences.  Fear-based planning following 9/11 has led to an unsustainable 
                                                 
1 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence 
Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, SSCI ATA Feb 2009 (Washington D.C.: Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence, 2009), 18. 
2 Ian S. Lustick, Trapped in the War on Terror (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 
71. 
3 For the purposes of this research, a nuclear attack is defined as one resulting in a nuclear-yield 
producing detonation, Matthew Bunn and Andrew Newman, “Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, An Agenda 
for the Next President,”  Cambridge, Mass., and Washington, D.C.: Project on Managing the Atom, 
Harvard University and, Nuclear Threat Initiative, November 2008, 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/uploads/Preventing_Nuclear_Terrorism-An_Agenda.pdf, 1.  
4 For examples see Mowatt-Larssen, “The Growing Threat of Nuclear Terrorism,” (paper presented at 
the March 31, 2009 IAEA conference) http://www-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Meetings/PDFplus/2009/cn166/CN166_Presentations/Session%203/INV-
13%20Mowat-Larsen.pdf, and Barack Obama, “Obama Prague Speech on Nuclear Weapons: Full Text,” 
The Huffington Post, April 5, 2005, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/05/obama-prague-speech-on-
nu_n_183219.html, and The White House, “NSPD-17/HSPD 4 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, December 2002,” Federation of American Scientists, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-17.html. 
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level of investment in an attempt to remedy all risks.5  The only way to reverse this trend 
is through the systematic and rational evaluation of threats to gauge the most effective 
application of national resources toward preventive measures. 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and again after 
9/11, the U.S. implemented a broad array of measures to address the risk of a nuclear 
terrorist attack.  Many of these efforts remain dispersed across numerous cabinet level 
departments without the guidance of a central, fully empowered leadership position.6  A 
resulting complication in implementing U.S. strategy involves the informal integration of 
efforts between the Departments of Energy, Defense, State, and Homeland Security.  One 
of the most difficult challenges in determining the effectiveness of any or all of these 
programs lies in the lack of any standardized, comprehensive, or coherent measures of 
success.  The disparate implementation of often-overlapping efforts and budgets creates 
conflicting reporting methodologies without producing any consolidated evaluation of 
security improvement.  This fragmented approach may create the possibility for terrorists 
to exploit gaps in U.S. and international efforts to control the access, movement, and use 
of nuclear weapons and fissile materials. 
The Security and Accountability For Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006 required the 
Department of Homeland Security’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) to 
develop a Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (Table 1.).  This effort seeks to 
integrate 74 federal programs involved in the prevention of nuclear terrorism both within 
the U.S. and abroad.7  The vaguely worded legislation that created the architecture 
loosely mandates coordination between the Departments of Homeland Security, Energy, 
State, Defense, and numerous other agencies but fails to delineate how this should be 
accomplished. 
                                                 
5 Ian Lustick, Trapped in the War on Terror , 3. 
6 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Detection, Preliminary Observations on the 
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s Efforts to Develop A Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, GAO-




Table 1.   Layers of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture.8 
This architectural depiction illustrates the expansive nature of the U.S. effort to 
prevent acts of nuclear terrorism.  The overall size and scope of this undertaking is 
significant, receiving a combined appropriation of $2.8 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2007.9  
A core element of the U.S. strategy to counter terrorists’ use of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) seeks to limit their ability to acquire fissile materials.  However, 
fiscal, political, and diplomatic emphasis may not reflect the urgency or relative 
                                                 
8 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “DHS’ Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Progress in 
Integrating Detection Capabilities and Response Protocols OIG-08-19,” U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, Office of Inspector General, http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_08-19_Dec07.pdf , 
10. 
9 U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-08-999T, 2008, 1–4. 
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importance of this strategic pillar.  Further complicating matters, global networks, 
unbalanced regional security, uncooperative state actors and technological advances serve 
to undermine this effort.  Without proper emphasis and funding, vulnerable materials and 
expanding proliferation may increase the ability of terrorists to steal, buy, or otherwise 
obtain fissile materials and carry out a nuclear attack.  During FY 2007, only $473 
million was made available to fund projects to secure, reprocess, or destroy nuclear 
weapons and fissile materials at their sources.10  To mitigate the threat of terrorists 
conducting a domestic nuclear attack, the U.S. may be disproportionately emphasizing 
internal and border security programs while programs focused on securing foreign 
nuclear weapons and materials at their sources might offer more substantial and 
quantifiable security benefits. 
The U.S. government should approach the threat of terrorists acquiring fissile 
materials with a coherent implementation strategy, not as an ad hoc compilation of 
additional departmental duties.  Clearly, the U.S. government cannot protect everyone 
from everything at all times.  U.S. efforts to prevent acts of terrorism are constrained by 
national fiscal limitations that may tighten under contemporary economic conditions.11  
To achieve the greatest degree of safety and security, policy makers must calibrate 
effective responses against a realistic threat assessment to make the most of declining 
fiscal resources.  Without this judicious effort, areas in need of increased security 
measures may not receive adequate or timely attention.12 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
In an attempt to prevent future terrorist attacks, U.S. government officials and 
scholars have analyzed and compared numerous risks to determine the best allocation of  
 
 
                                                 
10 William Tobey, “Testimony on the ‘FY 2008 Budget Request for the NNSA's Office of Defense 
Nuclear Nonproliferation’ before the House Appropriations Energy and Water Subcommittee,” National 
Nuclear Security Administration (March 22, 2007), http://nnsa.energy.gov/news/1226.htm. 
11 Ian Lustick, Trapped in the War on Terror, 71. 
12 Ibid., 72. 
 5
resources.  To prevent a terrorist nuclear attack, many politicians and scholars agree that 
securing nuclear weapons and fissile materials at their sources represents the first and 
best “line of defense.”13 
The general threat of a nuclear terrorist attack includes many possibilities: the 
attack of a nuclear facility, the dissemination of nuclear materials via a Radiological 
Dispersal Device (RDD), the use of a state-produced nuclear bomb, or the non-state 
fabrication and use of a yield-producing bomb.  Of these threats, a detonation resulting in 
a nuclear yield would produce the most grave and immediate consequences.  Despite 
significant attention, numerous sources of fissionable material remain dangerously 
vulnerable.14  Furthermore, current geopolitical events may increase the potential for 
terrorists to acquire fissionable material.  New states are pursuing uranium enrichment 
and plutonium separation while others are showing interest in expanding nuclear power 
production programs.  Each avenue poses risks for increasing the availability of fissile 
materials.  Global economic conditions and the evolution of terrorist sponsorship, tactics, 
and objectives may also contribute to the threat of terrorists acquiring fissile materials. 
Some suggest the current interagency distribution of funds and ranking of 
priorities may not adequately focus on the source security of fissile material.15  The U.S. 
spends billions of dollars annually to prevent acts of nuclear terrorism.  The U.S. 
National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction depicts a layered system of 
preventive measures ranging from securing materials at foreign sources to interdicting 
terrorists with weapons or nuclear materials at border crossings, ports, and within the 
U.S.  Several departments within the U.S. government manage these preventive programs 
independently.  The 2009 appointment of Gary Samore as the WMD czar may provide a 
cross-departmental perspective to aid in determining where additional funds could 
                                                 
13 Matthew Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2008, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 2008) 
http://www.nti.org/securingthebomb, v. 
14 Ibid. 
15 For examples see Bunn, xi, and, Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism:  The Ultimate Preventable 
Catastrophe (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2004), 140, and, Jospeh Cirincione, Bomb Scare (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 140. 
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provide the greatest impact.16  However, without budgetary or staffing authority, the 
WMD czar will be unable to forcibly direct the integration of these programs and 
distribution of resources from an overarching vantage point.17 
Through a comparative assessment of the U.S. programs that seek to prevent a 
nuclear terrorist attack and analysis of the threat of such an attack, this research answers 
three questions: 
Can a cross-departmental review of current preventive programs budgets, 
progress, and effectiveness reveal areas where a greater degree of security could be 
achieved per dollar invested? 
Are specific aspects of the terrorist nuclear threat better suited for targeting by 
preventive programs? 
Are the funding and focus of U.S. efforts to prevent acts of nuclear terrorism 
consistent with the most urgent and likely threats?  If not, what policy recommendations 
can be developed from a comparative analysis of current preventive programs and threats 
to better calibrate U.S. protective measures in order to achieve a greater degree of 
domestic security? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In Western capitals today there are quiet people, serious people, who, 
while recognizing the low probability of such an attack, nonetheless worry 
that the successful use of just a single atomic bomb could bring the 
established order to its knees—or lay it out flat.18 
1. Political and Scholarly Perception of the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism 
The thought of a terrorist attack using a nuclear weapon evokes a sense of 
extreme vulnerability and fear in most people.  The instantaneous destruction caused by a 
                                                 
16 The White House, 2002, 4-6, and Bunn, 124. 
17 Ibid. 
18 William Langewiesche, The Atomic Bazaar:  Dispatches from the Underground World of Nuclear 
Trafficking (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), 19. 
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nuclear detonation in a major U.S. city provokes an incomparable image of chaos and 
destruction.  A ten-kiloton nuclear bomb blast in virtually any major U.S. city would 
result in hundreds of thousands of deaths and a 1.5-mile circle of complete destruction.19 
Many prominent scholars agree that the likelihood of a terrorist nuclear attack is 
significant and possibly imminent.  Graham Allison explains “on the current path, a 
nuclear terrorist attack on America in the decade ahead is more likely than not.”20  
Literature from the Monterey Institute’s Center for Nonproliferation Studies explains the 
threat of nuclear terrorism “…looms larger today than ever before.”21  These well-
qualified sources clearly support the contention that a nuclear terrorist attack against the 
U.S. may occur in the not too distant future. 
Similarly, many significant governmental figures support this judgment.  Retired 
General Eugene Habiger, the former Commander of USSTRATCOM and leader of the 
Department of Energy’s anti-terror program until 2001, described the threat of nuclear 
terrorism by stating “it is not a matter of if; it’s a matter of when.”22  Nuclear Emergency 
Support Team (NEST) veteran Alan Mode echoed this sentiment.23  Likewise, when 
Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge was asked what keeps him awake at night, 
his answer was “nuclear.”24  This concern remains a very prominent issue within the 
current U.S. administration as well.  President Obama, in Prague, recently stated: 
…we must ensure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon.  This is 
the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.  One terrorist 
with one nuclear weapon could unleash massive destruction.  Al Qaeda 




                                                 
19 Allison, 1–4. 
20 Ibid, 14–15. 
21 Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (Monterey, CA: 
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2004), 1. 
22 Allison, 6. 
23 Jeffrey T. Richelson, Defusing Armageddon, Inside NEST, America’s Secret Nuclear Bomb Squad 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2009), 144. 
24 Allison, 6. 
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And we know that there is unsecured nuclear material across the globe.  
To protect our people, we must act with a sense of purpose without 
delay.25 
These statements convey the broad governmental assertion that the threat of 
nuclear terrorism is disturbingly likely and worthy of the utmost preventive attention to 
ensure that terrorists do not acquire a nuclear weapon or the materials to build one.  
While the consequences of a terrorist nuclear attack attract significant political attention, 
the application of preventive efforts must also weigh the threat, including both the intent 
and the capability to successfully carry out an attack.26 
2. The Risk of a Terrorist Nuclear Attack 
The potential for a nuclear bomb to cause massive destruction is not debatable.  
However, the likelihood of such an attack raises three fundamental questions that must be 
answered to fairly and rationally characterize the scope of the threat:  1) Do terrorists 
intend to acquire a nuclear weapon?  2) How do they intend to use it?  3) Do they have 
the ability to carry out such an attack?27 
Al Qaeda’s efforts to procure a bomb and Osama bin Laden’s stated desire to use 
one clearly demonstrate intent.28  Similarly, Aum Shinrikyo’s use of chemical and 
biological weapons coupled with its pursuit of a nuclear weapon strongly suggests their 
intentions for use against the general population in the pursuit of political and ideological 
objectives.29  While only a few terrorist organizations have expressed nuclear ambitions, 
the potential consequences of even a single successful attack demand further evaluation 
of the threat. 
                                                 
25 Obama. 
26 Willis, et al., 6–9. 
27 Henry H. Willis et al., Estimating Terrorism Risk (Arlington, Virginia: RAND Corporation, 2005) 
6. 
28 Jason Pate and Gary Ackerman, “Assessing the Threat of WMD Terrorism,” James Martin Center 
for Nonproliferation Studies, CNS Reports (2001), http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/wmdt.htm. 
29 Jeffrey T. Richelson, Defusing Armageddon, Inside NEST, America’s Secret Nuclear Bomb Squad 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2009), 123-128 and Jonathan B. Tucker, “Chemical 
Terrorism: Assessing Threats and Responses,” in Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism, ed. Howard 
and Forest (Columbus: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 214–215. 
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In the 2009 Annual Threat Assessment, Director of National Intelligence Dennis 
Blair provided the Intelligence Community’s assessment that al Qaeda continues to 
pursue plans for attacks against the U.S. homeland, “focusing on prominent political, 
economic, and infrastructure targets designed to produce mass casualties and visually 
dramatic destruction.”30  Currently, al Qaeda is the only terrorist group assessed to 
actively harbor intentions for a nuclear attack against the U.S.31  The 9/11 Commission 
Report notes that in 1995 Osama Bin Laden attempted to purchase highly enriched 
uranium (HEU) through a Sudanese military officer for $1.5 million.32  While the 
material did not turn out to be HEU, the event confirmed Bin Laden’s interest in pursuing 
a nuclear capability.  Aum Shinrikyo, with a membership of over 50,000 and financial 
resources exceeding one billion dollars, attempted to purchase nuclear weapons and 
fissile materials through Russian sources.33  When these efforts failed, the group 
purchased property in Australia known to contain uranium deposits.34  Clearly, some 
terrorist organizations have demonstrated the intent to pursue nuclear weapons.  
However, the capability to carry out an attack must also be examined to provide the other 
half of the threat depiction. 
The capability to execute such an attack includes acquiring a complete nuclear 
warhead or an adequate quantity of fissile material, as well as the scientific, technical, 
and financial resources for building, transporting, and detonating a bomb.  Clearly, if 
terrorists are unable to obtain a bomb or the fissile material, the remaining requirements 
become irrelevant.  Difficulties in production, purchase, and theft coupled with the 
comparative ease of acquiring other weapons have undoubtedly played a key role in  
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discouraging and preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear warheads or fissile 
materials.  Despite these hurdles, the expanding use of nuclear technology will continue 
to present new acquisition opportunities. 
Abundant, peaceful nuclear energy production programs can potentially be used 
to justify uranium enrichment or become a source for clandestinely reprocessed 
plutonium.  Either case represents another potential source of fissile material beyond 
those of purchase or theft.  In February 2007, a delegation from the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) met with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to discuss 
pursuing a feasibility study for a nuclear power program.  Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and 
Jordan are each considered potential candidates to pursue nuclear power and possibly 
weapons, especially in light of Iran’s indeterminate nuclear ambitions.35  Similarly, many 
of the countries of Northeast Asia have the technical prerequisites to produce nuclear 
weapons and possibly increasing motivation due to North Korea’s weapons production.36 
Terrorists’ ability to carry out a nuclear attack rest largely on their capacity to 
acquire either a functional nuclear bomb or the materials to fabricate one.37  To date, 
many authors agree the start-to-finish production of a nuclear weapon requires the 
resources and determination of a state.38  An independent nuclear weapons program 
requires the support of an extensive and modern industrial complex, a staff of qualified 
scientists and other highly technical specialists, a secure environment to conduct a long-
term production effort, and a financial commitment of billions of dollars per year.39  Due 
to these prohibitive weapon construction requirements, terrorists would likely attempt to 
acquire a complete nuclear weapon through a state sponsored transfer or theft. 
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The North Korean government has been directly implicated in trafficking 
narcotics, counterfeiting U.S. currency, and other criminal activity for over thirty years.40  
Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld described North Korea as the world’s 
“single largest proliferator of ballistic missiles.”41  As late as April 2006, the U.S. State 
Department still listed North Korea as a state-sponsor of terrorism due to its historic ties 
to terrorist activities.42  Estimates suggest that before its nuclear test in 2006, North 
Korea likely had produced enough plutonium for 6 to 8 small nuclear bombs.43  Current 
intelligence assessments of the North Korean nuclear program indicate the capacity to 
produce enough plutonium for one weapon annually and a uranium enrichment effort 
with a small but undetermined capacity.44  Selling weapons or materials presents inherent 
supply- and demand-side difficulties.  The slightly more transparent Pakistani program 
indicates that even a relatively small-scale weapons production program generates costs 
in the billions of dollars.45  Based on production costs as well as cases of small amounts 
of fissile material offered for sale in the former Soviet Union (FSU) states, the black-
market cost of a nuclear weapon would likely run into the hundreds of millions if not 
billions of dollars.46  Despite numerous cases of sales and theft of fissile materials, there 
is no evidence that a complete weapon has ever been stolen or sold.47 
While deterrence may not hold a significant degree of leverage against non-state 
or terrorist actors, the certainty of retribution against states typically does.48  Advances in 
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the forensic identification of nuclear materials make it increasingly possible if not likely 
that a nuclear attack would be quickly traced back to a state of origin.49  In 2001, the 
Department of Defense concluded that it was unlikely that any state would willingly 
transfer a nuclear weapon to a non-state actor.50 
If terrorists are unable to procure a complete nuclear bomb, they still may attempt 
to purchase or steal enough fissile material to construct their own.  While bomb 
construction and delivery pose significant difficulties, acquisition of the fissile material is 
widely regarded as the most significant hurdle.51  Due to the complexity involved with 
uranium enrichment or plutonium separation, terrorists would most likely acquire 
weapons-grade fissile materials through a state-sponsor or theft.52  Stephen Younger, 
former director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), explains that one must 
acquire a sufficient quantity of weapons-grade uranium (U-235) or plutonium (P-239) to 
build a yield-producing bomb. 53  IAEA documents explain that an actual nuclear bomb 
could be fabricated from as little as 25 kilograms of HEU or 8 kilograms of plutonium.54 
The IAEA reports that between 1993 and 2003 there were 540 confirmed cases of 
illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.55  Russia is frequently cited as one of the most 
likely sources for terrorists to steal or purchase nuclear materials.  Russia may currently 
possess as many as 16,000 nuclear weapons and hundreds of storage facilities housing 
weapons-grade plutonium and uranium.56  Numerous works also suggest that Russian 
nuclear custodians may be susceptible to bribery due to low wages, economic instability,  
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and a culture where corruption is often tolerated.57  Despite considerable progress over 
the past 15 years in securing the Russian nuclear stockpile, accountability and security 
concerns remain.58 
In contrast to this grim assessment, other prominent authors point out that the 
early 1990s represented the period where weapons and materials were most vulnerable.  
If weapons or significant amounts of fissile material were sold or stolen, where have they 
gone and why have they not been used?59  Despite dozens of interdicted sales of minute 
quantities of fissile materials, there is no evidence of there ever being a sale or transfer of 
a significant quantity to a terrorist or any other party.60  The extended historical absence 
of terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons or a significant quantity of fissile material 
presents a strong argument that current mitigating efforts may be balanced appropriately 
and operating effectively. 
After acquiring the requisite material, terrorists would face the challenge of 
constructing a nuclear device capable of achieving the necessary chain-reaction.61  
Implosion designs require significant technical expertise to construct and are considered 
much more sophisticated.  In contrast, HEU, gun-type weapons are generally regarded to 
be relatively simply to construct and the likely choice of material and design for 
terrorist.62  Collectively, the challenge of acquiring the necessary materials, constructing 
an operable weapon, and transporting it to a target present enormous and costly 
challenges and numerous opportunities for discovery and interdiction. 
3. U.S. Strategy and Preventive Programs 
The 2009 White House Homeland Security Agenda lists 12 strategic goals 
directed toward preventing nuclear terrorism.  The first goal listed is to “Secure Nuclear 
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Weapons Materials in Four Years and End Nuclear Smuggling.”63  The U.S. strategy for 
countering nuclear smuggling is comprised of a complex system of efforts directed 
toward the ultimate goal of “keeping the world’s most dangerous weapons out of the 
hands of the world’s most dangerous people.”64  The U.S. National Strategy to Combat 
Weapons of Mass Destruction provides specific counter-proliferation and non-
proliferation functions creating a layered defensive framework to prevent nuclear 
trafficking and terrorism.65  Counter-proliferation measures are taken to prevent the 
undesired production, transfer, movement or storage of nuclear materials or technology.  
Military, intelligence, technical, and law enforcement communities across several U.S. 
governmental entities provide the structure for this exceedingly difficult task.66  Non-
proliferation programs seek to control the production, supply and storage of nuclear 
weapons related materials and technology through the implementation of multilateral 
arms control treaties, export controls, and other related agreements or sanctions.  The 
counter-proliferation and non-proliferation strategic pillars are integrated through the 
enabling functions of intelligence collection and analysis, research and development, 
strengthened international cooperation, and targeted strategies against proliferators.67 
The U.S. leads and participates in many international efforts to control fissile 
material production, storage and trafficking.  The DoD Cooperative Threat Reduction 
(CTR) program seeks to dismantle, consolidate, and secure the enormous quantities of 
FSU weapons of mass destruction materials and more recently, such materials in other 
countries as well.68 
The Department of Energy’s, Material Protection, Control, and Accounting 
(MPC&A) program represents a multifaceted approach toward enhancing the security of 
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nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union states, China, Pakistan and India.69  This 
program is comprised of wide ranging efforts to upgrade the security of storage facilities 
and increase cooperative accountability measures.  MPC&A represents one of the largest 
and most successful efforts undertaken to increase the security of overseas nuclear 
warheads and fissile material. 
The Megaports Initiative is a component of the Department of Energy’s (DOE) 
Second Line of Defense (SLD).  This effort increases the capability to detect and deter 
smuggling of radioactive materials across international borders.70  Following the 9/11 
attacks, concerns grew that terrorists could smuggle a nuclear device into the country.  
While nuclear material could be transported in luggage, cars, freight, mail, or other 
means, some avenues represent a larger proportional vulnerability.  The U.S. annually 
receives over nine million shipping containers through its seaports alone.71  In 2003, 
DOE began deploying radiation detection monitors in conjunction with its Megaports 
Initiative.72  Under the Megaports Initiative, the National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA) collaborates with foreign governments to prevent the smuggling 
of dangerous nuclear materials.73  While this effort began in 2003, as of 2008, only 19 of 
75 targeted ports had been completed.74  A 2005 Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) report voices concern that DOE “does not have a comprehensive long term plan 
to guide the Initiative’s efforts.”75  The report goes on to indicate that funding shortfalls, 
technical challenges with detection equipment, and gaining the cooperation of foreign 
governments all pose additional operational and technical challenges.76  Possibly the 
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most disconcerting information in the report discusses the ease of using shielding 
materials, such as lead, to completely negate the fielded detection capability.77 
While not a funded element of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) launched on 31 May 2003, represents a cooperative 
global effort to stop the trafficking of WMD.78  Currently supported by more than 90 
nations, the plan encourages member states to increase searches and seizures of suspected 
WMD shipments and share information that may aid other member states in their 
efforts.79  This program is unique in that it has no formal structure and receives no 
dedicated funding but, due to its strong international support, may hold significant 
potential in deterring or detecting and interdicting the movement of WMD materials. 
The absence of a terrorist nuclear attack and the expansive reach of these 
programs may suggest a well-formulated plan directed toward securing fissile materials 
and preventing illicit trafficking.  However, many argue that these measures fail to direct 
sufficient resources toward overseas source security programs, or adequately account for 
the fluid nature of the threat and porous U.S. border and cargo security measures.80  The 
GAO has also been critical of a lack of centralized direction and any comprehensive plan 
to integrate the numerous disjointed nuclear security efforts.81 
4. Conclusion 
This literature review provided a survey of the political and scholarly opinions 
regarding the prospect of a terrorist nuclear attack.  Furthermore, it framed the threat of 
terrorists acquiring or building a yield-producing nuclear bomb by including perspectives 
on both the terrorist actor’s intent and requisite capabilities to successfully execute such 
an attack.  A broad discussion of U.S. strategy and several programs designed to prevent 
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a terrorist nuclear attack provided an indication of the wide-ranging scope of threat 
response measures.  Further analysis will reveal specific areas where security programs 
are not funded or prioritized to maximize their utility in preventing terrorists from 
acquiring or using fissile material to carry out an attack.  This analysis will provide 
opportunities to apply resources and strategic emphasis toward more productive threat 
reduction measures. 
D. METHODOLOGY AND OUTLINE 
This study begins with an analysis of the primary threat response programs 
including a survey of the funding, current implementation, remaining gaps, and ease of 
circumvention.  This research utilizes a qualitative comparison to establish current 
performance and opportunities for incremental security improvement.  The next building 
in this study encompasses the threat.  This section focuses on the capability of a terrorist 
actor to acquire a nuclear weapon or quantity of fissile material necessary to build a 
yield-producing bomb and transport the materials to a target within the U.S.  This 
analysis includes a survey of potential sources of foreign and domestic nuclear weapons 
and fissile material by terrorists as well as emerging geopolitical conditions that may 
increase material availability in the near future. 
This research compares the budgets and relative effectiveness of the primary U.S. 
programs to prevent acts of nuclear terrorism against the most serious threats of a terrorist 
nuclear attack within the U.S.  This comparative analysis bridges departmental lanes of 
responsibility to provide a holistic perspective and identify programs in need of 
additional resources as well as efforts where additional resources offer proportionately 
little added security.  Ultimately, this research determines how the funding and focus of 
major U.S. programs to prevent acts of nuclear terrorism could be more efficiently 
calibrated against the most urgent and likely threats and where opportunities for 
improvement exist. 
In order to accomplish this objective, Chapter II provides analysis of the primary 
U.S. programs to mitigate acts of nuclear terrorism.  This study focuses on U.S. nuclear 
security programmatic funding and effectiveness for specific measures of the Global 
 18
Nuclear Detection Architecture to provide a threat response perspective and proportional 
depiction of where emphasis is currently placed and where it is lacking. 
Chapter III explores potential avenues and opportunities for a terrorist to acquire, 
transport and employ a nuclear bomb.  Based on a survey of the locations and quantities 
of fissile materials, modes and methods of transportation, and weaponization options, this 
research develops a threat prioritization to identify focal areas where preventive measures 
should receive heightened emphasis. 
Chapter IV provides a comparative analysis of the findings in Chapters II and III.  
This analysis develops the rationale to support programmatic prioritization and funding 
adjustments among the array of U.S. preventive programs currently in place. 
Chapter V provides the primary conclusions based upon the research findings and 
offers policy recommendations at the programmatic and strategic levels. 
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II. PRIORITIZING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MAJOR U.S. 
PROGRAMS TO PREVENT ACTS OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM 
Historical examples of various types of illicit trafficking and simple logic suggest 
that as fissile materials disperse from their sources into grey and black markets or the 
hands of terrorists they become increasingly difficult to track and interdict.  As a result, 
the notion of securing all fissile materials at their sources, with suitable and verifiable 
protective measures, is considered by most experts to offer the greatest potential for 
reducing the threat of a terrorist nuclear attack.82  Senator Nunn, one of the CTR 
program’s architects and largest proponents, views source security as somewhat of a 
panacea that if comprehensively implemented could virtually eliminate the threat of 
nuclear terrorism.83  Unfortunately, significant obstacles stand in the way of fully 
reaching this illusive and deceptively promising end-state.  Incomplete identification of 
sources, inaccurate accounting of fissile material, and states unwilling to cooperate with 
U.S. efforts pose difficult challenges in effecting a comprehensive source security 
system.  Acknowledging these realities, the U.S. National Strategy to Combat Weapons 
of Mass Destruction employs counter-proliferation and nonproliferation functional pillars 
that create a complex, layered, defensive framework to prevent nuclear trafficking and 
terrorism.84  While the measurable effectiveness of each programmatic component varies 
considerably and their integration is at times questionable, the historic absence of a 
terrorist nuclear attack suggests some measure of efficiency. 
Through a series of overlapping threat response programs, the U.S. strategy seeks 
to incrementally increase the likelihood that a terrorist would be detected and caught 
before carrying out a nuclear attack.  This strategic intent, framed within the Global 
Nuclear Detection Architecture, affords that no single measure should be exclusively 
relied upon.  The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture includes programs to secure 
special nuclear and radiological materials at foreign sources and detect their movement 
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through foreign ports and border crossings, the U.S. border, and inside the U.S.  Within 
the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture’s framework, the layers of defense are divided 
into three broad categories:  foreign source and transit, the U.S. border, and U.S. interior 
security.  The responsibility for implementing efforts to secure sources of nuclear 
weapons and fissile materials is divided between the Departments of Defense, Energy, 
State, and Homeland Security (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1.   Geographic Depiction of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture.85 
The goal of this chapter is to determine which programs offer the greatest security 
return on investment and assess whether those programs currently receive funding 
consistent with their preventive potential.  This chapter offers a qualitative assessment of 
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Government Accountability Office, January 2009, 10. 
 21
the major programs to prevent a nuclear terrorist attack by considering the funding, 
implementation, remaining gaps, and ease of circumvention.  For the purposes of this 
research, the U.S. border and U.S. interior layers of the Global Nuclear Detection 
Architecture will be considered together, since an attack at a U.S. port, border crossing, 
or interior location would each represent an attack on the U.S. and bear indistinguishable 
national consequences.  Ultimately, this chapter demonstrates that while foreign source 
security measures provide some of the most quantifiable security results, inconsistencies 
in their application and long-term reliability diminish their relative significance when 
compared to other efforts.  Furthermore, diplomatic constraints prevent the application of 
additional resources from being freely applied toward overseas source security programs, 
whereas other defensive efforts could benefit significantly and immediately from 
additional funding. 
A. OVERVIEW OF FISCAL YEAR 2007 PROGRAM BUDGETS AND  
 FOCUS BY AGENCY86 
Since 1992, the U.S. has allocated over $10 billion toward overseas programs to 
secure fissile material and prevent nuclear smuggling.  Recently the U.S. committed to 
continue its support by providing an additional $10 billion over the next decade to pursue 
nonproliferation and threat reduction programs in Russia and other former Soviet states.87 
In FY 2007, DOE, DoD, DHS, and DOS received combined appropriations for 
programs included in the global nuclear detection architecture totaling $2.8 billion 
(Figure 2 and Table 2).88  Resources allocated for overseas efforts were roughly 
equivalent to that of U.S. border and domestic security programs, each receiving 
approximately $1.1 billion.89  The remaining $577 million funded crosscutting programs 
generally applicable to both foreign and domestic activities including research and 
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development, training, and technical assistance programs.  Among the four departments, 
DOE received the largest share of both the overseas and domestic appropriations at 66 
and 76 percent, respectively. 
  
Figure 2.   Percentages of FY07 Budget Applied to Secure Overseas Nuclear 
Materials and Prevent Smuggling, Secure Domestic Nuclear Materials and 
Detect Nuclear Materials at U.S. Borders and Ports of Entry, and Efforts 
That Cut Across Both Areas90 
Note: “United States” includes efforts at the U.S border as well as within the U.S. interior. 
Table 2.   Distribution of Global Nuclear Detection Architecture FY07 Budget for 
Securing and Detecting Radiological and Nuclear Weapons or Materials.91 
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B. OVERSEAS ORIGIN, TRANSIT AND DEPARTURE SECURITY 
The U.S. considers many of the nuclear-armed states and other countries in 
possession of fissile material to maintain adequate safety, security, and accountability 
measures (such as France, Japan, and the United Kingdom).  Others, such as North Korea 
and Iran, may not maintain acceptable transparency or security standards but will likely 
remain opposed to any direct U.S. involvement.  In the center lie countries in need of and 
willing to accept security assistance, such as Russia and Kazakhstan.  This international 
political landscape provides the boundaries within which U.S. security programs operate.  
Russia’s relatively cooperative demeanor and possession of a vast percentage of the 
global supply of weapons and fissionable material, much of which was previously 
identified as being inadequately secured, creates a logical focal point where most U.S. 
funded overseas efforts are directed. 
1. DoD Overseas Nuclear Security Programs 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the U.S. reacted quickly to 
address concerns regarding the safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons and fissile 
material.  With the passage of the “Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991,” also 
known as the Nunn-Lugar Amendment (P.L. 102-228), the U.S. began providing 
assistance to states of the former Soviet Union (FSU states that inherited strategic nuclear 
weapons include Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan) to transport, consolidate, 
secure, and dismantle nuclear weapons and delivery systems.92  Initially Congress 
provided funds exclusively to DoD to conduct nuclear threat reduction assistance efforts.  
In 1993, the DoD created the “Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program” title to 
describe these collective assistance efforts.93  After the CTR program’s inception, 
Congress began dispersing elements of the nuclear nonproliferation and threat reduction 
mission and budget among the DoD, DOE, DOS, and eventually DHS.  Furthermore, 
these programs have broadened in scope beyond the initial nuclear focus to include 
biological and chemical threats, foreign and domestic border and port security, and a host 
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of other related initiatives.  Although often misused, the CTR program title specifically 
refers to those programs undertaken by the DoD, while the phrase “threat reduction and 
nonproliferation assistance” refers to the collective efforts of the DoD, DOE, DHS and 
DOS.94 
Of the CTR program’s five objective areas, only two specifically direct resources 
toward consolidating and securing nuclear weapons and fissile materials at their sources 
and in transit.95  These two objective areas include the Nuclear Weapons Safety and 
Security program, the Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security program, and the 
Proliferation Prevention initiative 96  The remaining CTR objective areas involve 
strategic delivery systems, biological, and chemical weapon destruction, infrastructure 
dismantlement, and administrative tasks.97 
a. The Nuclear Weapons Safety and Security Program 
Operating on an FY08 budget of $102.5 million, the Nuclear Weapons 
Safety and Security program provides enhanced security at nuclear weapons and fissile 
material storage sites.98  Using the DoD nuclear security standard as a model, the CTR 
program seeks to establish and maintain strict security at 42 permanent and five 
temporary nuclear weapon storage sites.99  Currently the program sustains upgraded 
security measures at the five Ministry of Defense (12th Main Directorate) temporary rail 
transfer points.  As of December 2007, 12 of the 42 permanent storage sites had received 
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full upgrades, with an additional 12 scheduled for completion in December 2008.100  
Confirmation of the sites scheduled for completion in 2008 has not yet been published. 
The ancillary Fissile Material Storage Facility project provides safe, 
secure, and centralized storage for weapons-grade fissile material and was completed and 
turned over to Russian control in December 2003.101  Pending the successful conclusion 
of the bilateral Framework Agreement regarding transparency negotiations, the CTR 
program will continue to provide funding for monitoring assistance at the Mayak storage 
facility.102  The Mayak facility’s maximum storage capacity of 50 tons of plutonium and 
200 tons of HEU (roughly equivalent to 25,000 nuclear warheads) make its security of 
paramount importance.103 
The Nuclear Weapons Safety and Security program also encourages and 
offers assistance for the dismantlement of strategic nuclear weapons.104  This facet of the 
CTR program has made remarkable progress, reducing the Russian nuclear stockpile by 
7,260 warheads, 79 percent of the intended goal of 13,300.105  This project is scheduled 
for completion in FY 2013.106 
b. The Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security program 
The CTR program also enhances Russian nuclear security by assisting 
with the transportation of 1,000 to 1,500 nuclear weapons annually.107  This project 
provides security analysis, specially designed rail cars and associated security equipment 
to enable warhead shipment to dismantlement, or more secure, consolidated storage sites.  
In FY 2007, with a budget of $32.7 million, this subset of the CTR program supported 47 
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train shipments.  It will continue to support an average of four shipments per month 
through FY 2012.108  There are no guarantees that CTR supports every nuclear weapon 
shipment, but rather only those for which the Russians request assistance.  As a result, 
there are no firm metrics depicting the percentage of weapons shipments that receive 
additional security through the CTR program in contrast to those receiving exclusively 
Russian security.  However, based on consolidation and dismantlement plans and the 
10,000–15,000 weapons remaining in the Russian inventory, the CTR program likely 
affects most if not all of the weapon shipments.109 
c. The Proliferation Prevention Initiative (PPI) 
The Proliferation Prevention Initiative provides assistance to non-Russian 
FSU countries to prevent smuggling of WMD or related materials across their borders.  
Currently, through the PPI, DoD provides assistance to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, 
and Uzbekistan.110  The program includes both land border and maritime counter-
smuggling measures, but has no long-term objective leading to a definitive end-state.  
Continued cooperation, the installation of additional radiation detection monitors and 
alarms, and the provision of logistical support and training represent the primary goals 
included in the CTR five-year plan.111  This program received $32.4 million in FY07 
with no firm data published regarding any quantifiable security enhancement. 
2. DOE Overseas Nuclear Security Programs 
Two programs accounted for nearly 81 percent of the FY07 DOE budget to secure 
foreign sources of fissile material.112  With an overall budget of $736 million, the 
Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program accounted for $414 
million, and the Second Line of Defense utilized $183 million. 
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a. Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting 
The MPC&A program, managed by the DOE’s National Nuclear Security 
Agency (NNSA), strives to “secure nuclear weapons and weapons-useable nuclear 
materials by upgrading security at nuclear storage sites and by consolidating nuclear 
materials to sites where installation of enhanced security systems have already been 
completed.”113  The Materials Consolidation and Conversion program and the Global 
Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) are efforts included within the MPC&A funding 
total.114 
The MPC&A program provides facility security upgrades in two phases.  
During the first phase, upgrades consist of measures to delay unauthorized access to 
nuclear weapons and fissile materials.  These measures include high security doors, 
windows and locks, perimeter fences, and entry control point barriers.115  The second 
phase includes comprehensive upgrades in monitoring, alarm, and detection systems, 
consolidation of protected materials, electronic access measures, and guard force 
optimization.116 
Under the MPC&A program, the NNSA identified 105 Russian nuclear 
storage sites with 223 buildings in need of security upgrades.117  These sites contain 
roughly 600 metric tons of fissile material, enough to fabricate approximately 41,000 
nuclear warheads.118  The 105 sites include 63 Ministry of Defense sites (52 warhead and 
11 naval reactor fuel), 31 civilian research or reactor sites, and 11 weapon storage sites 
within the Russian State Nuclear Corporation (Rosatom) complex.119  NNSA security 
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assessments indicate that the quantities stored within the Rosatom complex account for 
more than 80 percent of the total material in need of security upgrades.120 
The MPC&A program has successfully implemented security measures 
for over half the 600 tons of fissile material.121  However, in 2006, the DOE changed the 
way in which it measured the progress of this program.  Reporting now reflects the 
percentage of facilities with upgrades instead of the percentage of materials protected by 
the upgrades (Figure 3).122  This change clearly diminishes the utility of the metrics by 
providing a deceivingly inflated building completion percentage while a significant 
quantity of fissile material has not received comprehensive security upgrades.  Under the 
new progress tracking system, DOE reports from September 2007 announced that 90 
percent of the rapid and comprehensive upgrades were complete, effecting 194 of the 215 
target buildings.123 
 
Figure 3.   FSU Buildings with DOE Security Upgrades.124 
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The DOE Material Consolidation and Conversion project provides 
assistance by consolidating fissile materials and blending down HEU for use in LEU-
fueled reactors or to a purity level unsuitable for weaponization.125  The plan dictates the 
removal of nuclear material from 55 buildings and the conversion of 17 tons of HEU.126  
Currently available statistics do not provide the progress of the HEU conversion but do 
indicate that greater than 40 percent of the buildings have been cleared of nuclear 
materials.127 
The DOE’s GTRI does not focus on nuclear security threats stemming 
solely from the FSU.  Rather it seeks to pursue global opportunities to secure or remove 
sources of nuclear material that could be used to fabricate a yield-producing weapon.  
GTRI has recently accelerated plans to convert 45 HEU-fueled research reactors to LEU 
but remains largely constrained by diplomatic hurdles and to a lesser extent the funding 
necessary to incentivize and implement the conversions.128  Beyond this effort, GTRI 
seeks to collect an additional 1.4 tons of “other source” HEU by the end of 2013.129 
b. Second Line of Defense 
The DOE Second Line of Defense (SLD) program provides assistance in 
detecting nuclear and radiological materials at foreign border crossings and ports.  The 
Megaports Initiative represents the largest SLD component.  This program seeks to 
increase the capability to detect and deter smuggling of radioactive materials through 
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major international seaports.130  This program provides a standoff benefit by screening 
cargo at foreign points of departure rather than U.S. ports of entry. 
In 2003, DOE began deploying radiation detection monitors in 
conjunction with its Megaports Initiative.131  Under the Megaports Initiative, the NNSA 
collaborates with foreign governments to prevent the smuggling of dangerous nuclear 
materials.132  Since its inception in 2003, upgrades at only 19 of 75 targeted ports have 
been completed.133  A 2005 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report voices 
concern that the DOE “does not have a comprehensive long term plan to guide the 
Initiative’s efforts.”134  The report goes on to indicate that funding shortfalls, technical 
challenges with detection equipment, and gaining the cooperation of foreign governments 
all pose additional operational and technical challenges.135  Frequent false alarms from 
naturally radioactive sources such as kitty litter, fertilizer, ceramic tile, and bananas, slow 
the cargo screening process and in some cases have even led officials to reduce the 
sensitivity settings or turn off scanning equipment.136  Under the Megaports program, 
U.S. personnel do not participate in the cargo screening at foreign ports.  Foreign customs 
officials operate the radiation detection equipment and decide whether to conduct any 
secondary cargo inspection.137  Despite these reasonably obvious and well-publicized 
deficiencies, one might question whether a terrorist would risk moving a scarce and 
costly nuclear weapon or quantity of fissile material through a monitored port instead of 
attempting to smuggle materials through remote, less protected routes. 
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3. DOS Overseas Nuclear Security Programs 
With an FY07 budget of $42 million, the DOS Export Control and Related Border 
Security Assistance (EXBS) program provides radiation detection capabilities at foreign 
border crossings as well as a wide array of training assistance to the recipient nations.  
Through these and other measures, the program seeks to fulfill the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 requirement to aid in preventing the 
proliferation of WMD materials and technology.  Similar to other border and port 
screening assistance efforts, no metrics exist to accurately determine the effectiveness of 
this program.  Inspection officials attempting to move radiological sources through 
screening portals, also known as “red teams,” can provide a general yardstick, however, 
these types of tests cannot account for materials that simply bypass border and port 
checkpoints or materials that make it through undetected.  The creation and sustenance of 
international cooperative relationships may be the greatest advantage achieved by these 
programs.  In fact, most recorded border interdictions of nuclear materials have resulted 
from police, intelligence, and border security interagency cooperation, as opposed to 
detection by radiological monitoring equipment.138 
4. DHS Overseas Nuclear Security Programs 
Funded at $139 million in FY07, DHS manages the Container Security Initiative 
(CSI).139  Through this program, DHS provides foreign ports with multidisciplinary 
teams of agents to aid in screening maritime cargo containers bound for the U.S.  DHS 
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shipping containers.140  As of January 2008, CSI teams were operating at the DHS 
objective of 58 seaports in 33 countries around the world. 141  These ports account for 86 
percent of U.S.-bound maritime cargo.142 
The CSI program relies heavily on the agent’s consistent ability to discern high-
risk containers and the screening equipment to identify nuclear materials.  The efficiency 
of this program is difficult to ascertain, since materials that make it through undetected 
are obviously unknown.  However, access to only 86 percent of the more than 10 million 
containers arriving in the U.S. annually indicates that roughly 1.5 million containers 
essentially bypass this scrutiny.143  Of the 8.5 million containers that transited through 
CSI ports in 2007, 140,000 were selected for screening resulting in an inspection rate of 
less than two percent.144  The GAO further notes that limitations in nuclear detection 
technology coupled with the use of simple shielding methods may allow nuclear 
materials to pass through the screening apparatus undetected.145 
While the CSI program attempts to increase the likelihood of interdiction of 
nuclear and radiological materials during transit through ports, its utility is questionable.  
Assuming a terrorist or smuggler would attempt to move nuclear materials through a 
CSI-protected port (as opposed to one of the many that are not); the DHS agents must 
then determine through investigative means that the container represents a high-risk.  As 
noted previously, with the addition of shielding, a container holding some types of 
nuclear materials could easily pass through screening undetected.  This program likely 
provides some measure of deterrence, but beyond that, the program itself offers only a 
minute statistical increase in measurable protection.  In fact, it may actually drive 
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smugglers toward unprotected borders and ports potentially reducing the likelihood of 
interdiction.  This dilemma highlights the absolute necessity for balance and strategic 
integration among preventive programs.  Strengthened port screening measures might do 
very little to increase security if not balanced with effective border security measures. 
5. Summary of Overseas Nuclear Security Programs 
The current failure to integrate U.S. source and border security programs under a 
single strategic management umbrella complicates the evaluation and implementation of 
security efforts.  In a meeting between Presidents Bush and Putin in December 2005, an 
agreement was reached to pursue accelerated warhead storage security measures.  The 
United States agreed to provide security assistance at 15 additional sites, eight funded by 
DoD through the CTR program and seven funded through the DOE nonproliferation 
budget.146  This division of responsibilities might expedite the provision of security 
upgrades but can also present complications.  Inter-departmental differences in security 
standards, equipment, and measurement of effectiveness represent three potentially 
deficient areas.  For example, radiation detection monitors fielded by DOE and DoD 
detect both gamma and neutron radiation, while more than 20 fielded by DOS can only 
detect gamma.147  The DOS detectors have less capability to detect plutonium creating a 
relative vulnerability in the security architecture. 
Despite the demonstrated progress made in weapons dismantlement, a precise 
inventory and depiction of the security of weapons and fissile material would provide a 
more accurate measurement of progress.  For example, one unprotected weapon poses a 
much greater security risk than 500 weapons maintained within a sufficiently guarded 
storage complex.  In numerous reports, the GAO consistently criticizes the DNDO and 
departmental agencies for their poor selection of metrics.148 
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In spite of the lack of specificity and completeness, the available statistics demonstrate 
encouraging source security progress (Figures 4 and 5).  However, a lack of full 
transparency and remaining questions regarding the accurate quantities and locations of 
all nuclear weapons and fissile material prevent gaining a precise assessment of what this 
progress means in terms of the overall security situation. 
 
Figure 4.   Progress of U.S.-Funded Programs to Secure Nuclear Stockpiles.149 
 
Figure 5.   DoD and DOE Warhead Sites with Security Upgrades.150 
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While a lack of full transparency prevents a clear analysis of the progress made to 
secure Russian fissile materials, this research confirms a few key factors.  U.S. and 
Russian efforts under the CTR and MPC&A programs have markedly increased the 
security of nuclear weapons and fissile materials.  Resources invested here have a direct 
and consequential impact on improving security.  One ton of adequately secure HEU or 
plutonium effectively results in one ton being less accessible to smugglers or terrorists.  
However, considerable room for improvement remains.  While the site security measures 
implemented in Russia by DOE and DoD are considered effective, they are only 
implemented at sites agreed upon between Russia and the U.S.  The agreed upon sites do 
not house Russia’s entire nuclear arsenal or stockpile of fissile material.  Russian 
reluctance to open all facilities continues to slow or in some cases prevent progress. 
Primarily diplomatic delays and not funding shortages have resulted in the 
plodding progress achieved over the last 18 years.  Of the $1.1 billion spent on overseas 
programs in FY07, roughly $540 million directly funded securing nuclear weapons or 
fissile materials in transit or storage.  The remaining $580 million funded overseas border 
and port security enhancements, training and administrative costs.  While it might 
initially appear that too small a percentage of the overall budget actually affects the areas 
in greatest need of resources, the application of more money cannot bypass the 
diplomatic hurdles that prescribe the rate of implementation.   
C. U.S. BORDER AND INTERNAL SECURITY PROGRAMS 
1. DOE Programs within the United States 
Domestically, DOE focuses its resources and expertise on securing U.S. nuclear 
assets.  In FY07, DOE spent $846 million to provide security for U.S. nuclear weapons, 
components, special nuclear materials, and DOE operating locations.151  Similar to DOEs 
efforts in Russia, these programs endeavor to prevent even a single instance of theft, loss, 
diversion, unauthorized access, or a successful terrorist attack.  Despite a sound track 
record depicting no instances of a weapon or significant quantity of fissile material ever 
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being compromised, some suggest that vulnerabilities in the U.S. nuclear complex should 
receive immediate attention.152  The International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), 
supported by Princeton University, states that U.S. nuclear material consolidation efforts 
are proceeding too slowly and have not taken advantage of every opportunity to close 
sites and reduce the number of facilities.153  The report further notes that DOE sites, such 
as Los Alamos National Laboratory, Y-12, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and Hanford, 
have all received waivers exempting them from the more rigorous 2005 Design Basis 
Threat (DBT) security requirements.  These observations merit consideration.  However, 
the security afforded to U.S. nuclear materials, coupled with the immediate and 
unhindered ability to respond to a domestic incident of theft or diversion creates a 
formidable security barrier. 
2. DHS Programs within the United States 
The Department of Homeland Security plays the central role in preventing 
terrorists or other unlawful actors from moving nuclear weapons or fissile materials into 
and within the U.S.  DHS spent $274 million on domestic border and internal nuclear 
security measures in FY07.  The vast majority, $209 million, funded the Advanced 
Spectroscopic Portals and Radiological Portal Monitor programs.154 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection use both handheld and portal radiation 
detection systems to prevent nuclear materials from entering the U.S.  As of December 
2007, DHS had achieved the Congressional mandate to scan all cargo containers coming 
through the 22 largest U.S. seaports.  This represents 98 percent of the containers shipped 
to the U.S.155  Furthermore, 100 percent of the truck cargo arriving from Mexico and 91  
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percent from Canada receive scanning for nuclear materials.156  An aggregate of 96 
percent of all land and sea containerized cargo entering the U.S. now receives scanning 
for nuclear materials.157 
In total, DHS has installed over 470 radiation monitors around the U.S. at 
international mail and package handling facilities, land border crossings, and seaports.158  
Some suggest that while many of the DHS screening efforts present easily circumvented 
defenses, they at least provide increased layers of protection against terrorists and 
additional opportunities to interdict an illicit movement.159  Port and border security 
poses a significantly different challenge than source security and is often equated to 
trying to find a needle in a haystack:  in this case, a needle likely employing extreme 
measures to avoid detection.  Robert Nesbit, co-chair of the Defense Science Board’s 
Task Force on Strategies to Reduce the Risk of Terrorist Attacks with Nuclear, Chemical 
or Biological Weapons, explained in a 2008 testimony to Congress that if a theft or 
transfer to terrorists occurs, “we are in big trouble…it would be very difficult to detect in 
transit, stop, and secure the device prior to detonation.”160 
Through an independent evaluation, the DNDO identified numerous gaps in 
domestic security, including vulnerabilities posed by land border crossings into the U.S. 
among formal points of entry, small maritime vessels, and international general aviation 
aircraft (Table 3).161 
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Table 3.   Length of U.S. Borders162 
With nearly 20,000 miles of border, DHS may never be able to effectively secure 
all of it to the extent necessary to prevent the entry of a minimum quantity of fissile 
material necessary to produce a single nuclear device.  In attempting to do so, DHS may 
currently be over reliant on immature technological solutions and other border security 
resources.  In 2007, the GAO criticized the procurement of the Advanced Spectroscopic 
Portal (ASP) monitor and the Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System 
(CAARS), stating that their system reliability was based on anticipated performance 
levels not actual test data and that the proposed testing regime would not effectively 
assess the systems’ capabilities.163  On 8 May 2009, the Obama administration 
announced it would discontinue future funding for the ASP monitors and the CAARS 
without any indication of what equipment or measures would be employed in their 
absence.164 
3. Summary of Domestic Nuclear Security Programs 
A great deal of resources are expended on programs to adequately secure U.S. 
nuclear weapons and fissile material.  As a result, U.S. nuclear materials are extremely 
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well protected and progress is continually being made toward further improvement.  Most 
can agree that while the U.S. nuclear complex could benefit from some specific security 
enhancements, the materials and weapons stored in the U.S. are comparatively much 
safer and under much better control than those anywhere else in the world. 
The resources applied to border and port security present more difficult concerns.  
A layered security approach is appealing in theory, however, a lack of technology to 
effectively screen cargo for nuclear material coupled with expansive border regions 
lacking any protection diminish the utility of this strategy.  While current detection 
capabilities are clearly wanting, historically, the U.S. has not responded to challenging 
situations by simply conceding defeat.  The technological challenges in detecting nuclear 
materials should be viewed as the foremost opportunity to improve the security 
environment by applying the vast scientific resources of the U.S.  Border security and 
cargo screening capabilities and the underpinning research and development represent 
areas in dire need of additional resources and of greater political and strategic emphasis.  
While these focal areas do not currently provide the same tangible security benefits that 
source security measures offer, they do reflect areas where the greatest degree of 
improvement could be achieved.  Furthermore, these efforts do not rely on the painfully 
slow navigation of diplomatic channels.  Advancements in these areas could be 
implemented as soon as they were developed.  Finally, one might argue that domestic 
port and border screening may occur too late to significantly reduce the consequences of 
an attack.  While this perspective holds a degree of merit, it assumes that the technology 
could not be fielded at offshore cargo screening sites or at overseas sites manned by U.S. 
security personnel (such as the CSI ports).  Other potential cargo screening and border 
security solutions must be explored and resourced if the U.S. sincerely desires to mitigate 
the threat of a domestic nuclear terrorist attack. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
Collectively, source, border, and port security measures do not currently approach 
forming an impenetrable protective framework.  The efficacy of the Global Nuclear 
Detection Architecture and its constituent programs must weigh the objective against the 
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reality of the situation.  The strategic intent of these programs is not to simply reduce the 
flow.  To be effective they must prevent even one weapon’s worth of fissile material from 
being transported and employed by terrorists.  The challenges and complexity of this 
objective must be fully understood so that logical and effective threat response measures 
can be funded and implemented to quickly reduce the risk to the greatest extent possible. 
Numerous overseas sources remain insufficiently secure and, in many cases, poor 
transparency prevents establishing a firm accounting of materials and weapons where 
additional security is needed.  In FY 2009, while the U.S. appropriated $1.083 billion for 
programs to improve overseas controls on nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise, less 
than half, only $457.9 million actually went toward securing weapons and fissile 
materials at their source.165  This represents an 18 percent decrease from the FY08 
budget and only 16 percent of the $2.8 billion appropriated for all nuclear security 
programs contained within the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture.166  Although 
significant progress has been made, it has taken nearly 18 years with another five 
remaining before several U.S. funded efforts are scheduled to reach completion. 
In reality, diplomatic hurdles and not fiscal resources pose the greatest challenge 
to implementing effective overseas source security programs.  As a result, states of 
concern, such as Russia, North Korea, Pakistan, India, and Iran, that continue to impede 
full transparency and access will prevent the application of suitable and verifiable 
security measures.  While the immediate appropriation of additional resources would not 
help accelerate current efforts, a pre-approved funding line should be established to aid in 
responding quickly when unanticipated opportunities arise to offer source security 
assistance. 
HEU and plutonium each provide detection challenges and with little effort can be 
made virtually undetectable by many of the border and port screening systems currently 
fielded.167  This apparent vulnerability generates its own complications for terrorists 
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however.  While a sophisticated nuclear device might require several hundred pounds of 
lead shielding to bring the radiation below detectable levels, a crudely constructed bomb 
might require several tons of shielding.168  In either case, the movement and concealment 
of a nuclear weapon or materials would be complicated by the size and weight of the 
shielding.  Unfortunately, an unintended consequence of more effective border and port 
security efforts may simply direct terrorists to other less protected avenues of approach, 
including U.S. borders that annually allow 500,000 illegal immigrants across and stop 
only 10-15 percent of illegally trafficked narcotics.169  Clearly, the importance of cargo 
and border security is critical and both areas represent opportunities for vast 
improvement.  Furthermore, a strengthening of border and cargo security to prevent 
nuclear smuggling would also have ancillary benefits in stemming the flow of illegal 
immigrants, narcotics, and other types of illicit trafficking.  Finally, while foreign source, 
cargo, and border security programs can only be implemented at a rate dictated by 
diplomatic progress, domestic border and cargo securities are not similarly constrained. 
Most existing literature categorizes nuclear threat response programs along 
departmental or overseas versus domestic lines.  Through this panoramic examination of 
the primary programs involved in the global nuclear detection architecture, a separate and 
distinct division becomes apparent that garners little attention in GAO, departmental, or 
scholarly analysis.  This distinction lies in the underemphasized but consequential 
differences in measureable effectiveness and unilateral implementation ability among 
proactive and reactive threat response programs.  In defining this differentiation, 
proactive measures represent those that seek to maintain control and accountability of 
nuclear weapons and fissile material whereas reactive measures consist of those effort 
undertaken to track and recover materials over which sufficient control has been lost.  
While frequently studied together as comparable components of the Global Nuclear  
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Detection Architecture, segregating proactive and reactive programs in comparative 
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Table 4.   Proactive Versus Reactive Program Effectiveness Comparison 
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Overseas proactive measures, which secure materials at their sources and in 
transit, such as the CTR, MPC&A, and GTRI, bear results that can be quickly obtained 
when funding and political hurdles are cleared.  Their results are measurable, relatively 
predictable, and directly reduce the threat.  Furthermore, the measures undertaken to 
secure nuclear materials at storage sites and in transit do not burden the budget or delay 
the timeline with technological research and development requirements.  The technology 
to secure materials is mature, comparatively inexpensive, and can be rapidly deployed. 
The primary way for terrorists to circumvent well-implemented source security measures 
would be to move to another source.  This effect concentrates their efforts making them 
more detectable and easier to interdict. 
Despite some considerable advantages, overseas proactive source security 
measures bear certain drawbacks that must be carefully considered.  First, they are 
constrained by the willingness of the host nation.  At any point before, during or after the 
implementation of security upgrades, a diplomatic failure could end or delay progress.  
Second, security measures can only be directed toward identified sources.  Continued 
proliferation among states uncoopertive with IAEA inspection protocols will increasingly 
complicate efforts to secure all fissile material.  Finally, provided security systems are 
owned, operated and maintained by the recipient state’s security personnel.  Cultural, 
religious, economic or a host of other issues could lead to the circumvention of security 
systems and are completely outside the control of the U.S.  Ultimately, overseas proactive 
source security measures may be deceptively promising and the inability to 
comprehensively apply these measures significantly reduce their credibility as the 
cornerstone of a preventive strategy. 
Conversely, reactive programs, seek to detect and interdict movement of nuclear 
materials at border crossings, through ports, and other shipping modes.  As demonstrated 
by the Obama administration’s recent cancellation of spectroscopic portal monitors, this 
technology is not mature or sufficiently effective.  Research and development efforts risk 
failure, are expensive, and can take years to complete, each reducing the ability to apply 
rapid security improvements.  The beneficial effects of screening are difficult to quantify 
and porous borders make circumvention an obvious and fairly easy alternative.  In fact, 
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land border crossing and port screening might ultimately disperse terrorist and smuggling 
activity, encouraging their movement toward unprotected border crossings where 
interdiction becomes exceedingly unlikely.  These shortfalls, however, should inspire 
increased attention and the application of greater resources.  Many reactive programs are 
completely within the purview of U.S. unilateral implementation and as a collective 
category represent those programs with the greatest capacity to increase security. 
By distinguishing between proactive and reactive programs, it becomes apparent 
that the proactive source security programs receive a significant portion of the annual 
budget (Figure 6).  However, analysis of some of the underlying implementation factors 
reveals that overseas source security measures should not be over relied upon and that the 
strategic layer in greatest need of additional resources and emphasis is border and cargo 
security and the associated R&D necessary to expand interdiction capabilities. 
 
 
Figure 6.   Proactive Versus Reactive Budget Comparison 
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Less than 25 percent of the $2.8 billion annual global nuclear detection 
architecture budget is applied toward proactive measures to secure overseas sources of 
nuclear materials.  However, overseas source security programs do receive adequate 
resources to proceed at the rate dictated by current diplomatic progress.  Rather than 
trying to apply more resources, it may be more beneficial to increase the sense of urgency 
and importance on the political and diplomatic front in an effort to open new CTR 
venues.  When international negotiations present an opportunity to secure, consolidate, 
destroy, or remove nuclear material, every effort should be undertaken to accomplish that 
objective as quickly as possible.  It must, however, be remembered that overseas 
proactive source security measures may never eliminate the hazard in its entirety, and 
gaps in the remaining security architecture will continue to pose ongoing concerns unless 
a greater degree of reliability can be achieved among reactive security measures. 
This chapter explored the balance of resources and quantifiable effects of the 
primary preventive programs within the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture.  The 
research showed that the quantifiable utility of proactive source security programs far 
exceed that of reactive border and port detection efforts.  This may represent one reason 
that politicians appear to favor source security programs so heavily.  Tangible, short-term 
benefits are always much easier to convey to constituencies.  Despite this difference, 
there are clear opportunities and compelling arguments for pursuing reactive measures 
with much greater enthusiasm. 
While the fluid nature of the threat should discourage a fixed proportional 
resource distribution, this research has shed light on specific instances where a calibration 
of resource distribution may be in order.  The area of greatest weakness and in need of 
immediate attention is that of (reactive domestic and overseas) border and cargo security 
as well as the underlying research and development necessary to increase security in 
these areas.  Second, proactive overseas security programs have and continue to receive 
the funding necessary to keep pace with diplomatic progress.  However, the U.S. should 
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III. RISK ANALYSIS OF A DOMESTIC NUCLEAR TERRORIST 
ATTACK:  PRIORITIZING MITIGATION OPPORTUNITIES 
The estimated risk of a terrorist nuclear attack cannot be derived from the 
efficiency or inefficiency of preventive programs or their fiscal appropriations.  The 
terrorists have a vote and must possess the desire and capability to carry out such an 
attack for a risk to exist.  To maximize efficiency, preventive programs must precisely 
target specific elements that make up the risk they seek to mitigate. 
Risk represents the potential occurrence of an unwanted outcome resulting from 
an event as determined by its likelihood and the associated consequences.170  
Subsequently, risk analysis can provide important insights to aid in prioritizing mitigation 
efforts and resources.  While various risk assessment methodologies exist, the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), under the National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan (NIPP) framework, defines risk as a function of threats, vulnerabilities, and 
consequences.171  In keeping with the NIPP methodology, a threat estimate is obtained 
through an assessment of terrorists’ intentions and capabilities to execute an attack.  
Next, attributes that make an asset more susceptible to a selected hazard represent 
vulnerabilities.  Whether qualitative or quantitative, a depiction of overall vulnerability 
typically captures the likelihood of an attack being successful once it has been initiated.  
Finally, the consequences of an incident reflect the level, duration, and nature of the 
resultant loss.  Consequences, under the NIPP framework, include health and safety, 
economic, psychological, and governance impacts.172 
The formulaic representation of risk, R = f(T,V,C), demonstrates an important 
mathematical and methodological aspect of the relationship; some measure of each factor 
must be present to produce risk.  For instance, a scenario does not effectively generate 
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risk if a threat and vulnerability exist without a consequence.  Assuming a measure of all 
three factors is present, if any single factor can be reduced, the resultant risk is lowered.  
In this case, the risk of a domestic nuclear terrorist attack may be lowered if one or more 
risk factors can be reduced by identifying and applying focused mitigation efforts. 
This chapter explores the various elements of risk as they apply to the scenario of 
a domestic nuclear terrorist attack.  Through an analysis of the components of risk, (threat 
intentions and capabilities, vulnerabilities, and consequences,) specific attributes and 
relationships emerge that provide insight into where preventive programs might be 
focused to achieve the greatest degree of efficiency in reducing the risk of a domestic 
nuclear terrorist attack.  This chapter concludes that the security of domestic nuclear 
weapons and materials must represent the highest priority followed by increased U.S. 
border and transitory security and finally the ongoing implementation of overseas source 
security measures.  Based upon current levels of security, this chapter finds that port and 
border security programs, especially those protecting the U.S. border, must receive a 
greater degree of investment and emphasis in order to balance their effects with those of 
the other layers of security. 
A. THREAT ANALYSIS 
When considering any terrorist attack scenario, DHS defines threat as a 
combination of the intent and capability of the potential assailant.173  Both must be 
present to form a credible threat.  However, accurate and demonstrable depictions of 
these factors can be difficult to ascertain.  Both terrorists and belligerent state actors 
frequently undertake denial and deception to gain political leverage or strategic 
advantage.174  The burden of lifting the veil on the intent and capability of these 
adversaries lies largely on the shoulders of the Intelligence Community (IC).  To be 
effective, the IC must determine which terrorist groups show interest in pursuing a 
nuclear capability, the progress made in that pursuit, and their ability to carry out an 
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attack by various means.175  This research considers the threat elements of intent and 
capability independently because an increased understanding of either factor can assist 
security agencies in directing efforts toward more efficient and precisely targeted 
preventive measures. 
1. Threat Intentions 
According to the Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ WMD Terrorism Database, 
the number of terrorist attacks including some form of chemical, biological, radiological 
or nuclear (CBRN) component has increased over the past decade.176  Terrorist groups 
most likely to pursue an act of nuclear terrorism can be organized into four categories:  
apocalyptic groups, politico-religious groups, traditional nationalist/separatist groups, and 
single-issue groups.177  Of these four groups, the apocalyptic and politico-religious 
groups display the greatest degree of motivation to cause mass casualties, making them 
the most likely candidates to pursue an act of nuclear terrorism.178  The other groups 
would likely use the threat of a nuclear attack to obtain political objectives or gain 
recognition but would not risk the international backlash that would follow an actual 
attack.179 
An act of nuclear terrorism by any type of group would require careful planning 
and the conscious decision to pursue such a complex, lethal, and socially offensive attack.  
Terrorists would have to consider how well this type of attack would promote their 
intended goals, as well as the costs, risks, and technical complexities involved.  The 
growing lethality of attacks and expanding use of CBRN suggests terrorists’ desire to 
seek increasingly dramatic spectacles of violence.180  Without any doubt, an act of 
nuclear terrorism would achieve a dramatic psychological reaction, a common goal 
among all types of terrorists. 
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Due to the motivational, organizational, financial, and technical requirements 
necessary to detonate any type of nuclear device, it appears relatively easy to narrow the 
list of groups that might reasonably be willing to pursuing this goal.  Although there may 
be new, yet unidentified groups out there, most known terrorist groups have elected to 
abstain.  As the most prominent exceptions, Aum Shinrikyo and al Qaeda have each 
attempted to obtain nuclear materials and weapons.181  Aum Shinrikyo sought a nuclear 
weapon in an attempt to start a nuclear war and initiate Armageddon, although technical 
difficulties prevented any significant headway.182  Likewise, Osama bin Laden clearly 
expressed al Qaeda’s need and right to pursue nuclear weapons stating: 
Acquiring weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty.  If I 
have indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank God for enabling me to 
do so.  And if I seek to acquire these weapons, I am carrying out a duty.  It 
would be a sin for Muslims not to try to possess the weapons that would 
prevent the infidels from inflicting harm on the Muslims.183 
While some terrorist groups might possess strategic reasons for pursuing nuclear 
terrorism, only a small number have actually considered this type of attack.  An even 
smaller population has actually explored the building blocks necessary to construct a plan 
of action and only a few have taken any operational steps to achieve this end.184  
Numerous factors have swayed terrorists away from pursuing an act of nuclear terrorism.  
These factors can be divided into four groups:  implementation challenges, philosophical 
or moral issues, response fears, and insufficient capability.185  These four groupings 
represent the key reasons interested terrorists have not pursued nuclear means and areas 
where preventive efforts can be applied or existing ones strengthened.  Further analysis of 
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these groups reveals that deterrence by punishment, deterrence by denial, and a standard 
of normative behavior provide a large measure of the dissuading influence. 
As depicted by Thomas Schelling, deterrence by punishment represents a case in 
which one side’s threat of action makes the other yield or comply with stated desires.186  
The side being deterred exhibits the desired behavior out of the expectation and fear of 
the violence that will follow disobedience.  Ultimately, deterrence achieves its effects 
through psychological rather than physical means.187  Some terrorists’ apparent eagerness 
to die for their cause suggests irrationality and that targeting their membership or 
affiliations with lethal retribution could be ineffective.  However, this assessment may 
prove inaccurate when considering the effects of the surprisingly violent and focused 
U.S. military response following 9/11.  Despite obviously porous U.S. port and border 
security and the vast number of largely unprotected domestic targets, one might conclude 
that al Qaeda, at least for now, has received the message that it is unwise to attack the 
U.S. at home.  The absence of any attack or even a substantial threat of a domestic 
terrorist attack in the eight years since 9/11 remains a debatable testament to the deterrent 
effect of the Global War on Terror and the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Given the 
response to 9/11, an imaginative but conventional attack, terrorists must see that a nuclear 
attack would hold disastrous consequences for the offending party.188  The deterrent 
effect of the threat of retaliation is amplified as more states express their commitment to 
support severe retaliatory responses.  As the magnitude and likelihood of punishment 
increases, terrorists considering the pursuit of a nuclear attack may be persuaded to 
refrain completely or at least employ other means.189  Conversely, if a nuclear attack 
were to occur and go unpunished, the credibility and effectiveness of the deterrent threat 
would be significantly diminished. 
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Deterrence by denial represents a defensive strategy in which applied measures 
effectively raise the cost of a given action.190  While more extreme terrorists may be 
unaffected by threats of punishment, deterrence by denial may introduce difficulties that 
dissuade a nuclear attack in favor of a less costly alternative or one with a greater 
likelihood of success.  Measures taken to prevent access to nuclear materials or to restrict 
avenues or modes of material transportation may deter terrorists by increasing the 
difficulty, costs, and the risks associated with this specific type of attack.  This method of 
deterrence will not prevent all terrorist acts of violence.  It may however persuade 
terrorists to pursue other potentially less lethal, non-nuclear methods if thoughtfully 
applied toward that end.  While terrorist acts of violence are generally undesirable, a 
conventional attack in lieu of a nuclear attack represents a beneficial, lesser-of-two-evils 
alternative. 
Finally, normative behavior plays a role in discouraging acts of nuclear terrorism.  
The lack of a precedent provides a significant deterrent, indicating that other terrorist 
groups have found this option too difficult, too likely to incur massive retaliation, or 
simply unsuitable for furthering their objectives.191  The reinforcement and continuation 
of this behavior is of paramount importance.  After a terrorist nuclear attack, the taboo 
would be broken and others may be more likely to follow suit. 
Whereas opportunities to influence terrorists’ behaviors exist, simply recognizing 
the intent may pose a more difficult challenge.  Despite U.S. intelligence organizations’ 
success in identifying a few terrorist groups’ intentions and attempts to acquire a nuclear 
capability, some states have been able to cross the nuclear threshold with little or no 
accurate warning.  India’s test of nuclear bombs in both 1974 and 1998 came as both a 
surprise and an embarrassment to the IC.192  Conversely, the October 2002 National 
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that provided the rationale for going to war with Iraq, proved 
to be a gross overestimation. 
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Currently, attempting to define Iran’s intent poses a significant challenge to the 
IC.  While Iran maintains that all of its nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes, many 
are concerned that the nuclear materials and technology could enable the production of 
weapons.193  Iran’s ties to the Iraqi insurgency and Hezbollah create additional concerns 
regarding the possibility that it might provide fissile materials or a nuclear bomb to a 
terrorist organization.194  North Korea’s successful test of a nuclear bomb and subsequent 
increase in international prominence may provide an additional incentive for Iran and 
others to pursue a weapons program.195  However, without any confirmation, Iran’s 
intentions, whether peaceful or hostile, will remain unknown and difficult to oppose. 
In assessing the intent of others, examples of both successes and failures abound.  
Furthermore, intent is not an either-or prospect; it represents a continuum from the first 
thought up to the point of an attack.  In some cases less substantive indicators of intent, 
which can be confounded through deception and denial, must suffice for making policy 
decisions.  A broad coalition applying deterrent threats, deterrence by denial measures 
employed to increase the costs and difficulty of an attack, and the public reinforcement of 
normative behavior each hold promise as areas where additional emphasis could 
significantly reduce the nuclear inclinations of an already extremely small population of 
terrorists interested in pursuing this type of attack. 
2. Threat Capability 
The ability to acquire or build a nuclear weapon and deliver it to a target would 
require a large organization with significant financial and technological resources and 
represents an enormously complex undertaking.196  To analyze terrorists’ capabilities this 
section explores potential sources of nuclear weapons or materials, methods of obtaining 
a weapon or materials, and the necessary requirements to construct, transport and operate 
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a nuclear weapon.  This analysis highlights opportunities where security emphasis could 
significantly constrain terrorists’ ability to conduct a nuclear attack and provide 
additional preventive pressure. 
a. Potential Sources: A Global Nuclear Inventory 
A global survey of the locations and quantities of nuclear weapons, HEU, 
and plutonium can provide an indication of where terrorists might seek a source of 
supply.  There are currently nine states known or reasonably presumed to possess nuclear 
weapons:  the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, Pakistan, India, 
Israel, and North Korea.197  Of the states with nuclear weapons, the U.S. and Russian 
arsenals represent over 95 percent of the global inventory.198  Despite significant 
reductions made by both the U.S. and Russia since the end of the Cold War, more than 
20,000 nuclear weapons remain in their combined stockpiles (Table 5).199 
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Table 5.   Estimated Total Nuclear Weapons Stockpiles, 2008.200 
In addition to weapons, global stockpiles of HEU and plutonium represent 
a more widespread and frequently less secure potential source of nuclear bomb building 
material.  In mid-2008, the global supply of HEU was estimated at 1,670 +/- 300 metric 
tons.201  The United States and Russia alone possess over 95 percent of the global HEU 
supply.202  Despite U.S. and Russian programs to blend down excess HEU to LEU for 
use as reactor fuel, these two countries have retained a combined total of between 1,200 
and 1,800 tons of HEU, a quantity sufficient for producing between 25,000 and 50,000 
nuclear warheads (Figure 7).203 
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Figure 7.   National Stocks of Highly Enriched Uranium as of mid-2008.204 
In addition to military applications, HEU has also been used at locations 
around the world as fuel for research reactors.  While the U.S. has led a worldwide effort 
to secure civilian HEU and convert reactors to use LEU fuel, 28 countries still maintain 
enough HEU reactor fuel to build at least one nuclear bomb and approximately 140 HEU-
fueled reactors remain in operation.205 
Although the reduction of global HEU inventories is promising, world 
supplies of plutonium, obtained through the separation of spent reactor fuel, represents an 
area of deepening concern.  Of the global supply of approximately 500 tons of plutonium, 
the total is roughly split between military and civilian stockpiles.206  Despite this 
distinction, nearly all of the plutonium is considered of sufficient quality for weapons 
use.207  The U.S. and Russia possess around 90 percent of the 250 tons used for military 
purposes, while ten additional nations retain the remaining military and civilian 
inventories (Figure 8). 
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Figure 8.   National Stocks of Separated Plutonium.208 
While global quantities of HEU have undergone significant reductions, the 
global stockpile of separated plutonium will likely expand at least in the near term.  
Japan’s newly opened reprocessing facility at Rokkasho will generate a significant 
amount of separated plutonium until a mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) recycling facility can be 
constructed.209  India, Pakistan, North Korea, Russia, Japan, France, the United Kingdom 
and possibly Israel each continue to separate plutonium for military and civilian 
applications.210  As an indication of the rate of this trend, from 1996 to 2005, the global 
civilian plutonium stockpile grew from 170 to 250 metric tons.211 
This inventory, while imperfect, provides a suitable baseline and a point of 
departure from which focal areas can be established and progress or deterioration 
measured.  Considering the significant and widely distributed global inventory of nuclear 
weapons, HEU and plutonium, the proposition of effectively securing these materials 
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poses a challenge that may initially appear insurmountable.  This analysis clearly 
highlights some of the most disconcerting factors involved.  First, accounting and 
transparency for both materials and weapons are questionable and imprecise.  Second, the 
continued production of nuclear weapons, HEU, and plutonium will not make the job of 
securing nuclear materials or preventing a terrorist nuclear attack any easier. 
At the same time, this global inventory also demonstrates some factors 
that may suggest hope for efforts to secure fissile materials.  To begin, the number of 
states in possession of weapons and fissile materials has been well constrained in the six 
decades since the technology’s inception.  Furthermore, most, but not all of the states 
involved are stable, well developed, and on reasonably amicable terms with the United 
States, cooperative with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and provide a 
sufficient level security and transparency in their nuclear programs. 
Despite the apparent breadth of this challenge, it appears relatively well 
defined and therefore suited for incremental measures undertaken to increase, but never 
guarantee complete accountability or security.  Efforts undertaken to stop or limit the 
production of new materials, or locate, inventory, secure, consolidate or destroy existing 
materials will bear direct, immediate, and measurable impacts on improving the 
collective source security environment. 
b. Acquisition Alternatives: State Transfer or Theft 
Numerous scholars support the notion that the greatest hurdle preventing 
terrorists from conducting a nuclear attack is the difficulty of obtaining a state produced 
bomb or procuring enough fissile material to construct one.212  An independent nuclear 
weapons program is normally discounted as a viable option since it would require an 
extensive and modern industrial complex, a staff of qualified scientists and other highly 
technical specialties, a secure environment to conduct a long-term production effort, and 
a financial commitment of billions of dollars.213  Terrorists attempting to acquire a 
nuclear weapon or enough fissile material to fabricate their own would have to do so 
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through state transfer or theft.  For the purposes of this study, the options of state transfer 
and theft include any associated purchase arrangement.  A purchase would necessarily 
result from either a theft or tacit state approval and therefore does not represent a 
uniquely differentiated acquisition scenario.214 
Many view the likelihood of terrorists acquiring a nuclear bomb or fissile 
material through a state sponsor as remote for two primary reasons.215  First, the numbers 
of state-produced bombs, especially those considered at greatest risk for diversion or 
theft, in countries such as Pakistan or North Korea, are relatively few.216  States investing 
billions of dollars to achieve a weapons capability have significant economic and security 
interests in protecting their precious possessions.  These critical national assets are 
normally stored in well-fortified facilities and heavily guarded by elite military units.217  
Second, advances in the forensic identification of nuclear materials make it highly 
probable that a terrorist nuclear attack would be traced back to a state of origin.218  
Considering the significant risk and scale of retaliation, a transferring state would need to 
be exceptionally desperate or irresponsible to contemplate an act with such great risks.  In 
light of these factors, in 2001 the U.S. Department of Defense concluded that, “the 
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Despite clear incentives for states not to transfer nuclear weapons or 
materials to terrorists, some feel Pakistan may represent a case where the risk of state 
transfer may be the greatest.220  The convergence of Pakistan’s volatile domestic political 
situation and the Pakistani military’s historic support for radical Islamists generates a 
compelling concern.221  Whether a Pakistani leader could come to power who would be 
willing to support a transfer or a senior military member could act independently to 
provide a weapon, the implications would be significant.  However, preventing such a 
transfer does not necessarily entail identifying or taking any action against a prospective 
terrorist recipient.  In fact, measures taken that encourage or facilitate state responsibility 
may offer the best hope for success. 
Ultimately, a state transfer of a nuclear weapon or material would require 
the participation of the state, or at least a senior state representative with adequate access 
and authority.  Clearly communicated, state versus state deterrence policies and 
international assistance to improve security technology, methods, and infrastructure could 
increase security while concurrently increasing the costs and challenges faced by any 
terrorist seeking a transfer.  By focusing on the actions and intentions of the state, the 
terrorists’ influence in pressing for a state transfer could be significantly diminished 
without ever having to engage or even identify the terrorists.  Terrorists unable to 
negotiate a transfer of a nuclear bomb or sufficient materials to construct one would be 
forced to abandon their pursuit or attempt to steal (or purchase from someone else who 
had stolen) enough fissile material to construct their own.222 
According to the IAEA, between January 1993 and December 2006, there 
were 1,080 confirmed incidents involving nuclear or radiological material and criminal 
intent.223  Of these, only 18 cases involved weapons-useable HEU or plutonium and none 
of any sizeable quantity.224  While states such as North Korea and Iran instinctively raise 
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suspicion due to their ties to terrorist groups, continued deception regarding their nuclear 
programs and inflammatory rhetoric, countries such as Russia and Pakistan may present 
the greatest opportunities for theft due to their unique geopolitical environments.225 
The sheer quantity of material contained in the Russian nuclear stockpile 
combined with reports of less than adequate physical security and impoverished security 
forces susceptible to bribery or cooptation clearly support those who promote Russia as a 
likely target for nuclear theft.226  While these observations and supporting statistics are 
used to advocate Russia’s susceptibility to theft, they are equally effective in opposing 
this position.  Despite Russia’s massive stockpile, economic difficulties, security 
shortcomings, and track record of illicit trafficking incidents there is no evidence of there 
ever having been a theft of a significant quantity of weapons grade material or a weapon 
by a terrorist or any other party.227  An improving Russian economy and greater political 
stability also offer compelling arguments to suggest that the period of greatest threat may 
have passed.  Unfortunately, it would only take a single theft or transfer to negate this 
historical trend and ongoing examples of corruption and oligarchic power manipulation 
may pose some level of increased risk.228 
Security concerns involving Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal began to receive 
significant attention following the 9/11 attacks.229  After two unsuccessful assassination 
attempts against President Musharraf, Russian President Putin publicly suggested that 
terrorists might be able to gain access to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.230  To alleviate 
these concerns, the U.S. has provided extensive transportation, accounting, and state-of-
the-art weapon authorization code system upgrades to assist Pakistan in enhancing its  
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weapons security.231  While many security assistance details remain classified, by 2004, 
senior U.S. government officials were publicly stating their confidence in the steps taken 
to secure Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.232 
Both the Russian and Pakistani examples demonstrate the utility of 
cooperative U.S. efforts undertaken to provide security assistance coupled with each 
nation’s own national interest in preventing the theft of their weapons and nuclear 
materials.  If these states represent the worst-case examples, one could argue that the 
security enhancements already in place combined with the addition of future planned 
upgrades will only serve to extend the historic absence of any significant and successful 
theft.  While this conclusion may be correct, security policy must account for emerging 
threats as well and cannot be solely predicated on the historical absence of an event.  This 
absence may simply represent an untested avenue or an ongoing search for the right 
opportunity.  This analysis supports two conclusions; one, cooperative and national 
security efforts are effective in preventing theft and two, they should not be exclusively 
relied upon but rather viewed as a piece of the larger, layered, defensive strategy. 
c. Nuclear Bomb Construction, Transportation, and Use 
While the acquisition of fissile material or a bomb is widely regarded as 
the most significant hurdle for terrorists to negotiate, bomb construction and delivery also 
pose formidable organizational, technical, and financial difficulties.233  Assuming 
terrorists were successful in obtaining a sufficient quantity of fissile material, they would 
face considerable challenges involved with the construction, transportation, and 
detonation of an improvised nuclear bomb. 
According to the IAEA, a nuclear bomb could be fabricated from as little 
as 25 kilograms of HEU or 8 kilograms of plutonium (weights roughly equated to the size 
of a melon and a plum respectively).234  Terrorists would likely favor HEU for several 
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reasons.  Plutonium, being poisonous, radioactive and highly susceptible to oxidation, is 
extremely difficult to work with and much easier to detect by radiation screening 
apparatus.235  Plutonium also cannot be used to fabricate the far less complex gun-type 
weapon.236  In choosing a weapon configuration, terrorists could opt for either a gun-type 
or implosion-type.  A gun-type weapon normally consists of an HEU slug fired at a 
known velocity into an HEU target sphere.237  Some divergence of opinion exists 
regarding the simplicity of such a weapon.  Stephen Younger, former director of DoD’s 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), postulates that a gun-type weapon cannot be 
achieved simply by firing two HEU slugs at one another in an old artillery barrel, but 
instead must meet sensitive tolerances requiring complex machining and significant 
scientific oversight.238  Conversely, Nobel laureate Luis Alvarez explains that a suicidal 
terrorist in possession of modern, weapons-grade HEU would stand a good chance of 
achieving a high-yield detonation by simply dropping one half of the material onto the 
other.239  Despite this controversy, most authors agree that an implosion type-weapon 
requiring a nearly perfect, symmetrically timed detonation, would necessitate a degree of 
sophistication and competence beyond the capacity of virtually any non-state actor.240  
These factors together suggest that a terrorist would be far more likely to seek HEU as 
their primary choice of fissile material and pursue the fabrication of some form of gun-
type weapon. 
The next consideration would require a decision between assembling a 
weapon overseas and transporting it as one unit or smuggling pieces individually to be 
assembled once in the U.S.  Assuming that some complexity exists beyond dropping one 
piece of HEU on another, a weapon sufficiently engineered to sustain the rigors of 
transportation and reasonably likely to produce a yield might be of a size and weight 
similar to that of the Little Boy gun-type weapon dropped on Hiroshima near the end of 
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World War II.  Little Boy was ten feet long, twenty-eight inches in diameter, and 
weighed nine thousand pounds.241  A weapon of this size and weight would almost 
certainly have to enter the country through a land border crossing or through a seaport as 
cargo.  This reality highlights the strategic importance of screening the millions of cargo 
containers that enter the U.S. each year and reinforces the significance of continuing to 
improve the process and develop better detection technology.  The other alternative 
would be to smuggle in smaller components through cargo or drug and illegal 
immigration avenues of entry.242  While this might be feasible, this approach introduces 
the complicating factors of having to find a secure location to assemble the weapon, 
obtaining the necessary machining equipment for fabrication, and fielding a large cadre 
of smugglers and personnel to build the weapon.  This avenue would open up numerous 
opportunities for detection, any one of which could expose the plot.  Whether transported 
as a single unit or in pieces, each method supports the notion that border security, cargo 
screening, and domestic law enforcement, intelligence, and public awareness might act as 
deterrents and serve to undermine or interdict either type of movement scenario.  
Considering the disproportionate complication of transporting several pieces and the 
subsequent assembly challenges, terrorists would likely find it much simpler to attempt to 
smuggle a fully constructed weapon in through a sea or land cargo container, which could 
then be employed immediately. 
Detonating an improvised nuclear bomb represents the step most difficult 
to prevent.  A properly constructed bomb could be activated by a suicidal terrorist, 
remote control or even a timer.  The initiation would simply require the closure of a 
switch that would in turn apply power to fire the propellant bringing the two sub-critical 
masses of HEU together.  This could even be accomplished through the actions of an 
unknowing victim turning on a light switch, driving over a pressure plate or other 
innocuous act electrically or mechanically linked to the bomb’s firing circuitry.  The only 
hope at this point is that the device is either detected prior to initiation with enough time 
to stop it or that the device fails to function. 
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3. Threat Observations and Summary 
This panoramic analysis of both the intent and capability of terrorists to acquire 
the necessary materials and conduct a nuclear attack reveals several key factors.  Intent 
must be measured in degrees and in constant perspective of the necessary capabilities to 
conduct an attack.  Each factor can be diminished individually or collectively to reduce 
the overall threat.  While very few terrorists have expressed the intent to employ nuclear 
weapons against the U.S. or other states, even the remote chance of such an occurrence 
demands focused analysis and constant vigilance. 
Intelligence will continue to play a pivotal role in estimating the intent and 
capability of nuclear-weapon seeking terrorists and identifying potential sources of 
nuclear material.  However, historical failures in maintaining an accurate intelligence 
picture when only a few, slowly progressing state actors were involved strongly suggest 
that the ICs’ ability to keep up with rapidly expanding sources across black markets, grey 
markets, terrorist networks, and increasing state proliferators is highly questionable, if not 
impossible.  Due to the scope and seriousness of this threat, as well as the difficulties 
involved in generating accurate and timely information, intelligence should not be unduly 
relied upon to solve this dilemma.  Broadly applied programs to deter proliferation, 
secure nuclear materials, and interdict materials in transit and at border crossings must 
continue to play a role in deterring or preventing a terrorist nuclear attack. 
The sources of fissile materials range widely across the globe, the security of 
which varies considerably.  These sources have expanded in the decades since the 
technology was conceived, and destabilizing security situations in East Asia and the 
Middle East could foment cascading proliferation throughout each region and beyond.243  
With such small quantities necessary to fabricate a bomb, it appears likely that terrorists 
at some point might plausibly receive or steal enough fissile to construct a crude nuclear 
bomb.  While the U.S. pursues the goal of securing all fissile material, the likelihood of 
achieving this appears overly or perhaps hopelessly optimistic and reinforces the strategic 
importance of a layered defensive approach. 
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Despite the disconcerting and ominous threat of a domestic nuclear terrorist 
attack, this analysis clearly shows that the risk factors of threat-intent and threat-
capability can be reduced through the application of targeted mitigation techniques 
(Table 6).  Within the risk equation, the threat of a domestic nuclear terrorist attack 
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Table 6.   Mitigation options for the most probable terrorist attack scenarios 
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B. VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
A portrayal of vulnerability represents the likelihood that a terrorist attack is 
successful given that an attack has been undertaken.  An assessment of vulnerability 
includes analysis of physical, administrative, and other operational attributes that depict a 
target’s susceptibility to a given hazard.246  For instance, a convenience store clerk might 
work behind a physical barrier of bullet-resistant glass.  A prospective thief attempting to 
rob the clerk at gunpoint would likely be unsuccessful even after firing several rounds at 
the clerk.  In this simplistic example, an attack is undertaken but unsuccessful due to a 
physical attribute that effectively counters this specific threat.  The problem of mitigating 
vulnerability becomes dramatically more difficult when dealing with the massive 
destructive power of a nuclear detonation. 
A nuclear detonation, not unlike that of a conventional explosive, releases an 
enormous amount of energy that translates immediately into heat and blast overpressure.  
In the case of a nuclear detonation, radiation is also released as a product of the 
reaction.247  The initial explosive effects transition into secondary hazards including fire, 
building collapse, negative pressure wave, flying debris, and radiological fallout.248  
Assuming an attack has occurred, distance and protective works, such as subsurface 
construction, represent the primary methods for reducing the effects of heat and blast.  
The U.S. has employed target-hardening techniques in the construction of nuclear missile 
silos, as well as protective shelters for key governmental personnel.249  However, due to 
excessive costs, relatively small protective footprint, and the complexity of construction 
and subsequent access, these types of protective works are not practical for most public 
or private applications. 
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On February 26, 1993, terrorists detonated 1,400 pounds of fertilizer-based 
explosives in the underground parking garage of the World Trade Center.250  The attack 
did not cause the building to collapse as planned; however, six people were killed and 
over a thousand injured in this attack.251  On April 19, 1995, Timothy McVeigh 
detonated a truck loaded with 5,000 pounds of fertilizer-based explosives outside the 
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building.252  One hundred sixty-eight people were killed in the 
ensuing blast and nearly half of the nine-story building crumbled to the ground.253  The 
Khobar Towers bombing on June 25, 1996, also employed an estimated 5,000 pounds of 
explosives packed into a fuel truck and detonated outside a U.S. military housing 
complex in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.254  The blast killed 19 U.S service members, injured 
372, and brought down a significant portion of the eight-story building.255  By 
comparison, a crudely constructed 10-kiloton weapon would vaporize everything within a 
one-third mile radius and destroy virtually every structure within a one-mile radius.256  A 
larger 20-kiloton weapon, similar in size to that dropped on Hiroshima or Nagasaki, 
would damage or destroy most buildings in any modern city and kill everyone within a 
10-square-mile footprint.257 
The vast majority of infrastructure is simply not built to withstand a nuclear 
detonation.  Population centers, dams, bridges, power plants and other infrastructure 
would all be subject to significant damage or destruction following a nuclear attack.  A 
nuclear attack would have an enormous destructive capacity and once initiated would 
likely be viewed by terrorists as a success in virtually any setting and by any standard of 
measure.  The physical features of modern society render it exceedingly susceptible to 
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this hazard.  At the same time, the cost of comprehensive hardening to mitigate this 
vulnerability is cost-prohibitive and impractical at virtually any degree of 
implementation.  In this regard, one must depict the vulnerability factor in the risk 
equation as both high and fixed.  Any effort to minimize the risk of a nuclear terrorist 
attack will not be achieved by reducing vulnerability. 
C. ANALYSIS OF CONSEQUENCES 
As explained in the NIPP, the level, duration, and nature of loss collectively 
represents the consequences of a nuclear terrorist attack.258  More specifically, health and 
safety, economic, psychological, and governance impacts provide the quantitative 
benchmarks for an assessment.  Clearly, a domestic nuclear terrorist attack would 
generate enormous effects across all of these areas resulting in extremely grave 
consequences.  The precise consequences of an attack would derive from factors such as 
the location, time, and yield of the detonation.  The nuclear detonations in Nagasaki and 
Hiroshima fail to provide an effective representation of consequences because each was 
an airburst and in an environment that predated the current structural and technological 
advancements and dependencies.259  While no example can provide a directly 
comparative estimate, enough data exists regarding the effects of nuclear and 
conventional detonations, radiological impacts, mass casualty events, and governmental 
responses to draw substantive conclusions. 
In any major city, a nuclear detonation in the 10 to 20-kiloton range would 
instantly kill hundreds of thousands, possibly even millions of citizens.260  The effects of 
fire and radiation would ravage survivors within a mile-and-a-half radius and cause 
significant damage out to three miles or further.261  The 1986 explosion and subsequent 
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fire at the Chernobyl nuclear power reactor provides some illustrative examples of 
potential radiological impacts.  Due to the released radioactive materials, 350,000 people 
were forced to evacuate and permanently resettle.  Estimates suggest that tens of 
thousands of cancer deaths will occur in those exposed to the fallout.262  This event 
caused an estimated $300 billion in damage without any associated nuclear explosion.  
The 2001 attack on the World Trade Center represents another contemporary model 
useful for depicting a fraction of the economic impact that could be expected in the 
aftermath of a domestic nuclear terrorist attack.  One source suggests the measurable 
costs of the attack and subsequent response measures currently exceed $2 trillion and 
continue to grow.263  A nuclear detonation, causing physical and environmental damage 
many times greater would obviously generate an unparalleled and possibly unsustainable 
economic impact. 
In addition to the loss of life and economic damage, Americans would live in fear 
of another, similar terrorist attack.  Such an attack could easily erode public confidence in 
the government and wreak havoc across the national political landscape.  The 
government might respond with harsh security measures in an attempt to prevent follow 
on attacks.  History has shown through examples like the World War II internment of 
Japanese Americans, the U.S. rendition program for terrorist suspects, and the FBI’s 
domestic counter-intelligence program (COINTELPRO) activities, that some drastic 
measures taken to inspire public safety and confidence may be counterproductive.  
Possibly the most significant impact could result from self-inflicted costs following an 
attack.  Some suggest that the 9/11 attacks have drawn the U.S into a self-defeating spiral 
of fear, exaggerated response, and wasteful spending that far exceed the direct impacts of 
the actual attack.264 
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The consequences of a domestic nuclear terrorist attack would cause enormous 
effects across the U.S. and around the world.  Without any effective means of minimizing 
the consequences of a nuclear attack, this factor in the risk formula should be assessed as 
unalterably high. 
D. RISK ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Through this analysis of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, attributes have 
emerged that suggest areas where resources should be focused to reduce the risk of a 
domestic nuclear terrorist attack, as well as areas where additional investment would 
result in little or no security improvement or risk reduction (Table 7).  Despite the 
demonstrated inability to lower the vulnerability and consequence risk factors, any 
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Table 7.   Summary of Risk Analysis and Mitigation Opportunities. 
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Accurate intelligence can and must play a key role in focusing efforts directed at 
curtailing or manipulating the intentions of terrorists.  Targeted efforts have the capacity 
to shape terrorists’ intentions from inception all the way up to the point of the actual 
attack.  At any point along this continuum, preventive efforts may overcome the 
terrorists’ intentions and end or redirect the pursuit.  Deterrence by threat against a non-
state actor is most credibly applied by a broad coalition committed to employing force in 
response to a reasonably established threat.  The deterrent effect typically increases as the 
capacity and credibility of violence grows.  Deterrence by denial represents the 
cumulative effects of all the strategic layers of security.  The combined impact of source 
and border security, technological advances, law enforcement, intelligence, and other 
measures create costs and difficulties forming a defensive structure that effectively 
dissuades terrorists from a given pursuit.  The final factor influencing terrorists’ 
intentions is that of normative behavior standards.  Here, the most advantageous factor is 
the lack of an historic precedent; however, the inclusion of Islamic states in an opposing 
coalition of enforcing states will bolster this position enormously.  Each of these denial 
measures seeks to encourage the terrorist to decide of his own accord not to pursue a 
domestic nuclear attack. 
In diminishing the capability of terrorists to conduct an attack, every additional 
increment of source security is invaluable.  Sources are widespread and while relatively 
safe, certainly not secure enough to provide complete assurance.  Additional security 
should be applied at every opportunity, but other layers of security must be employed in 
conjunction to counter any potential leaks.  State versus state deterrence and supportive 
security assistance efforts offer a carrot-and-stick approach to encourage and aid states in 
policing their own actions and increase the difficulties faced by terrorists shopping for a 
sponsor.  If done effectively, this will force terrorists toward the alternative acquisition 
method of theft, which would likely result in timely reporting and corresponding 
interdiction efforts.  Fortunately, the historic record of nuclear weapon or fissile material 
theft does not support an assessment of extreme vulnerability.  Steadily improving 
security will only increase the costs and difficulties associated with this approach.  
Despite these optimistic indications, theft should not be ruled out as a possibility. 
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Shaping the threat environment does not necessarily entail defeating the enemy or 
completely removing a threat capability.  Instead, it allows a defender to apply targeted 
measures that force his adversary to either abandon a course of action or follow a path 
dictated by the defender that creates more difficulties for the attacker or is more easily 
detected and defended against.  For instance, instead of pursuing the goal of securing 
every kilogram of fissile material, one might instead opt to start by focusing resources on 
securing as much HEU as possible.  This could appear to recklessly neglect plutonium 
security, but this strategic decision might force a prospective terrorist to reconsider his 
plans in light of the technical challenges associated with the fabrication of an implosion 
weapon, the more toxic production environment and the increased ability to detect the 
materials with border and port screening apparatus.  Within the context of overseas 
source security, measures should prioritize the importance of weapons first, then HEU 
next, due to its unique suitability for improvising a nuclear bomb. 
In an overall assessment of the threat environment, the transitory security efforts 
fall short in comparison to the domestic and overseas source security capabilities.  As a 
result, a weakness is created by this imbalance that could be viewed by terrorists as an 
opportunity.  An imbalance or weakness in any area can increase terrorists’ threat-intent 
or threat-capability unless recognized and corrected.  A foreign-assembled weapon 
scenario emphasizes the importance of port and border cargo screening and detection 
while a domestically assembled weapon reinforces the significance of domestic law 
enforcement, intelligence, and better policing of cross border smuggling avenues.  In 
either instance, an increased emphasis is warranted in these areas that represent the 
weakest layer in the overall security architecture.  As the weakest layer, transitory 
security measures also represent the area where the greatest opportunity for improvement 
exists. 
Vulnerability and consequences are fixed, but threat-intent and capabilities offer 
opportunities where preventive measures and resources can be focused to increase 
security and reduce risk.  The inability to negate any single aspect of the threat depiction 
in its entirety demands that a layered strategy be employed to afford the best chance of 
preventing an act of domestic nuclear terrorism.  Through a diversified approach, 
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significant aspects of each threat factor can be reduced resulting in synergistic effects.  In 
the end, the prospect of pursuing a nuclear weapon should remain too dangerous, costly, 
or complex to represent a worthwhile investment for terrorists.  The assortment of 
preventive measures does not need to be equally funded or effective.  The collective 
effort must, however, be coordinated sufficiently to shape the operating environment 
facing terrorist actors.  A well-coordinated and implemented strategy should apply 
pressure on the terrorists, forcing the most motivated groups toward the most difficult and 
detectable means of attempting to gain a nuclear capability or out of the game 
completely.  As either or both of the threat intent and capability factors are reduced, the 
resultant risk of a domestic nuclear terrorist attack is also lowered. 
Proactive overseas source security measures do not hold a disproportionate degree 
of efficacy in reducing the threat of a domestic nuclear terrorist attack.  While poor 
foreign source security is not desirable, complete foreign source security is likely not 
achievable or verifiable.  Accepting that proactive overseas source security is not a 
panacea and that other programs offer less quantifiable but critically important influences 
on threat-intent and threat-capabilities, a balance is clearly necessary that reflects this 
operational landscape. 
This threat analysis delineates some important nuances in calibrating the 
resources afforded to preventive programs within a preventive strategy.  The importance 
of securing domestic sources becomes increasingly apparent since a case of domestic 
theft or transfer would bypass numerous other layers of security.  Of equal importance, a 
case of domestic acquisition might also shorten the overall timeline leading to an attack 
thereby reducing the amount of time available to detect and prevent an attack.  Land and 
sea cargo as well as general border security measures are lacking by any measure and 
must be afforded a higher resource prioritization and strategic emphasis. 
While this chapter might appear to draw conclusions that are somewhat expected, 
the primary significance lies in the contradictions found between the risk perspective 
herein and the relative effectiveness of preventive measures discussed in chapter II.  The 
research in Chapter II, as well as the position of numerous scholars, suggests that 
proactive, overseas source security measures hold the greatest promise for achieving 
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heightened national security.265  In contrast, the risk analysis in this chapter reinforces the 
importance of pursuing a layered defensive strategy that balances each preventive effort 
within a strategic plan that can effectively shape the threat environment to the defender’s 
advantage. 
                                                 
265 For examples, see Bunn, v, Ferguson and Potter, 25, 34–35, Allison 92-93, and Cirincione, 141. 
 77
IV. ANALYSIS OF THREAT RESPONSE PROGRAMS AND RISK 
Numerous prominent scholars and U.S. government officials have repeatedly 
emphasized the importance of securing foreign nuclear weapons and fissile materials at 
their source as the first and most effective component in a strategy to prevent a domestic 
act of nuclear terrorism.266  This emphasis is based upon the widely promoted contention 
that acquiring a nuclear bomb or sufficient material to construct one represents the 
greatest barrier preventing a terrorist nuclear attack.267  Despite the popularity of this 
opinion, analysis of the current programmatic appropriations in Chapter II reveals that 
preventive resources are broadly distributed across programs that have proactive, reactive 
and crosscutting foci without any disproportionate fiscal significance afforded to securing 
foreign sources of nuclear bombs or fissile material.  To address this prominent and 
potentially significant contradiction, this analysis seeks to determine if resources should 
be recalibrated to direct more emphasis toward foreign source security efforts or other 
focal areas in order to reduce the risk of a domestic terrorist nuclear attack.  By 
comparing the effects of current programs that seek to prevent a domestic nuclear 
terrorist attack with the most plausible risk factors and resultant mitigation opportunities, 
estimates can be derived that suggest where resources and emphasis are adequate and 
where additional resources might provide a heightened degree of national security. 
Instead of relying on the often used and somewhat capricious foreign versus 
domestic expenditure or interdepartmental funding comparisons, this chapter will explore 
the more telling intersection between the program focus and effectiveness matrix 
developed in Chapter II and the risk mitigation perspective depicted in Chapter III.  
Specifically, this chapter will analyze the inter-relationships between the main preventive 
programs and the potential for each to reduce the risk factors of threat-intent and threat-
capability.  This analysis concludes that overseas proactive source-security measures are 
adequately funded to the extent necessary to keep pace with the current employment 
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opportunities enabled by diplomatic progress.  Similarly, the research demonstrates that 
domestic proactive source-security programs are both capable and sufficient.  Most 
notably this research finds that while reactive security measures offer some of the least 
tangible benefits, they represent the security layer most in need of increased funding and 
emphasis.  Unless steps are taken to address this deficiency, the Global Nuclear Detection 
Architecture will be unable to effectively counter today’s threat or prepare for 
tomorrow’s. 
A. PROACTIVE OVERSEAS SECURITY MEASURES AND RISK EFFECTS 
The primary efforts that provide proactive overseas source security emphasis 
include the DOE’s MPC&A and DoD’s CTR programs.  Collectively, these programs 
account for nearly $540 million or 19 percent of the $2.8 billion Global Nuclear 
Detection Architecture’s annual appropriation.268  These programs have the potential to 
rapidly provide quantifiable and direct increases in security, consist of mature 
technologies, and are more difficult to circumvent than most current reactive security 
measures.  Timing and responsiveness play a significant role in the efficacy of these 
source-security programs.  When political and diplomatic efforts open a window of 
opportunity to aid in securing foreign sources of fissile material, the U.S. should be 
prepared to act with a sense of urgency.  Any delay in implementation simply provides an 
additional and unecessary opportunity for terrorists to acquire a nuclear capability. 
From a risk perspective, these programs influence both the threat-intent and 
threat-capability factors making them particularly valuable in shaping the overall threat 
environment and reducing risk.  These measures diminish the threat by increasing the 
difficulties and costs incurred by terrorists seeking to acquire a nuclear bomb or fissile 
material.  These well-publicized international efforts may also deter terrorists through the 
reinforcement of socially acceptable normative behavior and the stigma attached to the 
illicit pursuit of nuclear materials.  In addition, these programs influence terrorist activity 
by making select targets more difficult and, therefore, less desirable than others.  As 
source security measures become more formidable and comprehensive, terrorists face the 
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decision of pursuing an increasingly well-guarded objective or foregoing the nuclear 
option in favor of another less risky alternative.  While the importance of source security 
programs and their impact on the threat environment are of paramount importance, 
challenges preventing their full implementation and continued reliability greatly diminish 
their utility as the linchpin of an effective security strategy. 
Beyond the clear inability to adequately and permanently secure all fissile 
material, there are additional obstacles that plague source-security efficiency.  Currently, 
the segregated application of source-security responsibilities, divided between the DOE 
and DoD, creates conflicting security prioritization, methodologies, and measurements of 
effectiveness.  The lack of a centralized leadership postion with statutory staffing and 
budgetary authority affects more than just the proactive overseas security programs.  This 
void of consolidated management generates inefficiencies across the entire Global 
Nuclear Detection Architecture and must be corrected before the full utility of the 
preventive architecture can be realized. 
Since overseas security programs are funded by U.S. taxpayer dollars and 
executed on foreign soil, they are often mired in beaureaucratic debate that slows or 
prevents implementation.  U.S. politicians have faced the challenge of justifying the 
investment in Russian nuclear security while potentially freeing Russian resources for use 
in weapon modernization programs.269  Others have argued that despite this potential 
drawback, the money invested in source security should be viewed as a direct 
contribution to national defense and worth every dollar.270  Considering both 
perspectives in this debate, the net effect of enabling some minimal level of Russian 
weapon modernization in order to gain the opportunity to apply vital source-security 
measures appears far more desireable than simply walking away and letting the situation 
unfold without U.S. involvement.  By comparison, the prospect of dealing with a nuclear-
armed Russia is far more manageable and familiar than with nuclear-armed terrorists. 
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Diplomatic barriers also play a role in reducing the effectivness of source-security 
programs.  Unfortunately, the capability to act does not lie exclusively within the purview 
of the U.S. government.  Assistance offered to other states has been delayed or rejected 
due to foreign national security, pride, and a host of other reasons.  The outcome of this 
arrangment simply means that despite good intentions, the ability to implement overseas 
security measures cannot be conducted solely at the discretion of the U.S. government.  
While Russia has been surprisingly cooperative, it still maintains sites that remain off-
limits to U.S. security assistance programs.  As an additional hindrance, many countries 
such as North Korea and Iran provide little or no access and are not expected to do so in 
the forseeable future.  Although this may represent a somewhat obvious limitation, it is 
an important factor to consider in balancing the application of preventive resources.  
While potentially less effective in some regards, U.S. border, port, and internal security 
measures can be implemented without the same constraints. 
A final argument against over-reliance on source-security programs lies in their 
long-term efficacy.  Physical-security measures are only as reliable as the personnel 
responsible for their employment.  State-of-the-art U.S. security apparatus can be 
installed virtually anywhere, but without proper training, operation, maintenance, and 
oversight the systems are virtually worthless.  This reality could come to bear in Russia, 
where economic incentives or institutional corruption might convince a security official 
to steal or circumvent security protocols in order to acquire fissile material.271  Similarly, 
in Pakistan, political unrest and ties to religious fundamentalism might encourage a 
security member to aid in the theft of nuclear materials.  In either case, the U.S. cannot 
and should not become over reliant upon source-security measures implemented on 
foreign soil by foreign security agencies to ensure domestic security. 
Although proactive overseas programs offer a substantial capacity to increase 
security and reduce the risk of an attack, they have not and likely will not ever be capable 
of accounting for every nuclear weapon or weaponizeable quantity of fissile material.  
There are too many holes in transparency, accountability, and long-term efficacy to 
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justify over reliance on foreign source-security programs as the predominant method of 
defense.  Clearly, source-security measures represent a vital element in the overall 
preventive strategy and an invaluable tool for shaping the threat environment.  However, 
despite the contentions of many scholars and politicians, overseas source-security 
measures do not represent a unitary solution capable of preventing an act of nuclear 
terrorism and should not be disproportionately funded or relied upon in an unrealistic 
attempt to achieve this end.  These programs currently receive the funding necessary to 
keep pace with the opportunities created through diplomatic negotiations. 
B. PROACTIVE DOMESTIC SECURITY MEASURES AND RISK EFFECTS 
The DOE is tasked with providing security for the domestic nuclear complex.  
With an FY07 annual appropriation of $846 million, this pursuit represents the largest 
single category of preventive investment at 30 percent of the $2.8 billion Global Nuclear 
Detection Architecture budget.272  These collective efforts seek to ensure the security of 
nuclear materials at domestic operating locations, laboratories, storage facilities, and in 
transit.  Without the burden of diplomatic bureaucracy and international sensitivities, 
these programs can typically be modified and enacted on a much faster and predictable 
timeline than their overseas equivalents.  Furthermore, the effects of these programs can 
be easily observed and quantified.  The efficacy of these programs results from their 
management by a single agency, domestic oversight and implementation, and the direct 
results achieved through source security improvements. 
The risk mitigation effects of domestic proactive security measures are significant 
but potentially undervalued in their role in preventing a domestic nuclear terrorist attack.  
Terrorists seeking to carry out a nuclear attack may perceive the complexity and 
difficulty of smuggling a nuclear bomb or fissile materials into the U.S. as too difficult or 
risky.  The only alternative would be to acquire the bomb making materials domestically.  
If a terrorist were able to acquire a bomb or fissile materials in the U.S., he would 
effectively bypass many of the layers of security that collectively form the defense that 
the national strategy relies upon.  This consideration elevates the relative importance of 
                                                 
272 Shea, 14. 
 82
domestic nuclear security and justifies the greater proportional investment afforded to 
this effort.  From a threat perspective, a robust domestic nuclear security program reduces 
the capability for terrorists to acquire fissile materials.  It can also influence their intent 
by increasing the difficulty and cost of pursuing the acquisition of materials within the 
U.S. and force the consideration of the alternative cross-border movement risks. 
While historically very successful, domestic proactive security is not without its 
own challenges.  The effectiveness of domestic source-security efforts not only plays a 
role in deterring and preventing theft or diversion of nuclear materials for terrorist use, it 
also plays a pivotal role in communicating reliability and credibility to other states.  A 
successful theft of a nuclear bomb or fissile material in the U.S. could quickly call into 
question the legitimacy of U.S. programs to implement heightened security measures at 
foreign locations.  Ultimately, a domestic security breach could jeopardize the continued 
application of overseas security measures resulting in increased opportunities for 
terrorists to acquire and move nuclear materials.  Furthermore, a successful theft of 
domestic nuclear materials could encourage other terrorists to attempt the same course of 
action and result in the demand for dramatic and costly increases in domestic security.  
For these reasons, the impenetrable security of domestic nuclear materials is of 
paramount importance. 
Other challenges in the domestic security environment result from complacency 
and political infighting for the distribution of resources and jobs among constituencies.  
Each of these influences can serve to delay the dismantling of weapons and consolidation 
of fissile material and ultimately reduce the level of domestic nuclear security from what 
could otherwise be achieved without these obstructions. 
These factors reinforce the necessity for an impenetrable domestic nuclear 
security system and substantiate the level of investment in domestic source-security.  
When analyzing how to best apportion resources to prevent a domestic nuclear terrorist 
attack, it should be remembered that if the U.S. cannot protect the materials within its 
own borders first, then in all likelihood it should not be relied upon to aid in the 
protection of other states’ nuclear materials. 
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C. REACTIVE SECURITY MEASURES AND RISK EFFECTS 
Reactive security programs represent a broad compilation of efforts dispersed 
among the DOE, DoD, DHS, and DOS, that seek to aid in the detection and interdiction 
of nuclear materials at foreign and domestic borders and ports.  With a collective annual 
appropriation of $609 million in FY07, these programs constitute 22 percent of the total 
Global Nuclear Detection Architecture budget.  The division of responsibility between 
departments is somewhat vague and has resulted in the utilization of various types of 
screening equipment, methodologies, and differentiated prioritization of security 
measures.  Programatically, these efforts fall short in providing substantive or 
quantifiable measures of effectiveness.273  Many of the programs rely upon immature and 
ineffective screening and detection technology.  Many also rely exclusively upon foreign 
security agents to operate U.S.-provided detection equipment and effectively enforce 
cargo screening protocols.  The disjointed application of these efforts allows numerous 
avenues for terrorists to circumvent each security measure, not the least of which is 
simply crossing over unsupervised border areas.  Based upon these considerations, these 
programs currently offer a deterrent and defensive value that is difficult to quantify.  This 
limitation becomes especially important when attempting to justify the quantity of 
resources invested in them. 
On the other hand, despite the general inability to precisely measure their 
contributions, reactive programs have been shown to enhance the security architecture in 
some significant ways.  The port and border crossing security and law enforcement 
entities included in these programs offer fine-grained local intelligence, similar to that 
which normally leads to drug and other types of smuggling interdiction.274  The U.S. and 
foreign cooperative relationships formed during the implementation of overseas port and 
border security assistance programs have resulted in numerous cases of nuclear 
smuggling interdiction, clearly proving there is some direct and synergistic value to these 
efforts.275  The continued creation and sustenance of international law enforcement and 
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intelligence relationships improve detection and counter-smuggling capabilities and 
convey a sense of collective resolve to deter terrorist actors.  While difficult to quantify, 
these relationships increase deterrence by denial and threat through their implementation. 
Quantitative analysis of the security contribution provided by reactive programs is 
less than conclusive.  However, when the impact on the threat-intent and threat-capability 
is considered, the value of these programs becomes more prominent.  Random or 
intermittent cargo screening and nuclear detection measures provide a deterrent effect, 
that aids in shaping the threat environment to the defender’s advantage.  Although current 
screening and detection technology may be immature, it represents a crucial first step.  
While this technology continues to be refined and improved by defenders, it may be 
much more difficult for terrorists to test and improve their nuclear smuggling capabilities 
to the same degree or at the same pace.  Despite the currently low likelihood of nuclear 
materials being detected in transit, terrorists may not wish to risk the seizure of their 
invaluable cargo by attempting a movement through a protected port or border crossing.  
Further contributing to the deterrent effect, interdiction of nuclear materials in transit 
shown to have a terrorist nexus would likely lead to some measure of undesireable 
retribution.  For a terrorist, these factors may force the consideration of the alternative 
complexities involved in moving fissile material or a nuclear weapon in smaller, 
disassembled pieces and ostensibly by a larger contingent of participants, each opening 
additional windows for detection and interdiction. 
Domestically, one could surmise that more effective cargo screening might drive 
terrorists toward utilizing unprotected border crossings.  It may, but it also allows 
defenders to shape the threat environment and influence the terrorists’ planning factors.  
If the standard sea, air, and land cargo avenues are sufficiently protected to deter 
terrorists’ use, this would likely force a prospective nuclear terrorist to transport a bomb 
in smaller components for subsequent assembly within the U.S.  Improved domestic 
screening, surveillance, intelligence, public awareness and better security across 
ungoverned border regions could each play a role in tightening this security gap.  
Furthermore, enhanced border security would provide secondary benefits stemming from 
an increased capability to interdict illegal drug and immigrant flows.  Collectively, these 
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efforts might also slow the timeline of an impending attack.  As opposed to a complete 
weapon being brought in as cargo, a weapon requiring assembly would necessitate more 
time to prepare.  This would offer authorities more time to detect and interdict a terrorist 
plot.  More efficient sea, air, and land cargo security increases the costs and difficulties 
faced by terrorists and in this regard favors the defender and aids in shaping the actions of 
the adversary. 
While far from perfect, even minimally capable reactive security measures 
introduce a significant consideration that prospective nuclear terrorists would have to 
weigh when deciding upon a course of action and estimating their chances of success.  
Reactive security measures provide a valuable threat-mitigating influence that belies the 
frequently disparaging assessment of their quantifiable utility.  An increased application 
of resources toward these efforts will enable the strengthening of relationships in the 
international security arena and allow detection and interdiction tactics, techniques, and 
procedures to be refined and improved upon.  If these efforts are dismissed as worthless 
due to their sporadic application and incomplete effectiveness, the other less tangible 
benefits and any future advancement in these pursuits would be lost. 
As previously discussed, the effects of deterrence lies in the mind of the 
adversary.  These measures provide direct results as evidenced by the sucessful instances 
of interdiction, but more importantly, they can introduce a sense of risk, vulnerability, 
and doubt in the mind of terrorists attempting to move the materials necessary to 
construct or employ a nuclear bomb.  This ability to manipulate terrorist’s intentions and 
actions must be retained, developed, and harnessed as an element of an effective layered 
strategy.  As a final observation, reactive programs that encompass transitory security 
efforts represent the architectural layer where the greatest room for improvement exists.  
The application of additional resources in this area could directly reduce the threat if 
more capable detection systems were developed and fielded and borders were more 
substantially monitored and secured.  Both the intent and capability of terrorists to pursue 
a nuclear attack could be reduced if a strengthened ability to prevent cross-border and 
cargo movement of fissile materials was implemented. 
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D. CROSSCUTTING MEASURES AND RISK EFFECTS 
Crosscutting security programs primarily include research, development, test, and 
evaluation (RDT&E) initiatives, as well as U.S. and foreign training programs generally 
applicable to preventing nuclear smuggling and terrorism.  These programs are 
administered by several departments, and collectively received a $577 million budget in 
FY07.  This figure represents 21 percent of the annual Global Nuclear Detection 
Architecture’s appropriation.  One might first notice that the funding for these programs 
in FY07 exceeded that of the proactive source-security programs by some $37 million.  
While the budget figures vary slightly from year to year depending on the progress and 
completion of specific initiatives, to even suggest that these efforts are deserving of equal 
fiscal attention opens room for discussion. 
RDT&E and training initiatives do not generate easily or immediately quantifiable 
increases in physical security, however, they do contribute to the continued success and 
improvement of the overall campaign to prevent a domestic act of nuclear terrorism.  
RDT&E of new technological systems to aid in the detection and identification of nuclear 
materials moving through ports, border crossings, and other transitory avenues is 
proportionately more costly than simply implementing and maintaining security measures 
consisting of mature technologies.  Furthermore, detection and screening RDT&E efforts 
have been fraught with setbacks due to the scope and technological difficulty of the task.  
However, without continued investment to improve detection capabilites, little or no 
mass screening progress will occur in the reactive security environment.  Training, on the 
other hand, represents an investment in the human capital that underlies every security 
system and method employed to prevent a nuclear terrorist attack.  Without continued 
investment in the education of security personnel, their effectiveness will decline and 
each element of the security architecture will suffer.  Termination or reduction of the 
funds applied to RDT&E or training would effectively forfeit the potential for future 
technological progress and jeopardize the current implementation of every layer in the 
Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. 
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E. ADMINISTRATIVE OVERHEAD 
Administrative overhead represents the cost of doing business in any operation.  
In FY07, the overhead expense amounted to $231 million or 8 percent of the total Global 
Nuclear Detection Architecture budget.  At first glance, this level of investment may 
seem excessive.  However, the cost of facilities, transportation, computers, paper, pens 
and other general support requirements, dispersed among locations around the globe, 
quickly add up.  In analyzing the calibration of the proportional resource distribution 
among Global Nuclear Detection Architecture programs, this category can be viewed 
simply as a necessary operating expense, and largely removed from further deliberation. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In a world where thousands of tons of weapons-grade plutonium and uranium are 
stored in dozens of countries, at hundreds of facilities, and protected by tens of thousands 
of custodians, the relative likelihood that terrorists, at some point, will acquire enough 
material to make a bomb is both threatening and plausible.  When an amount of HEU the 
size of a melon is sufficient to fabricate a crude nuclear bomb, the challenge of designing 
effective security measure becomes increasingly obvious.  Accepting that foreign source-
security or any other measures alone will never be capable of providing a complete 
assurance of safety, the importance of the collective effects of all the layers of defense in 
shaping the threat environment is apparent. 
When considering the goal of preventing a single domestic nuclear terrorist attack 
and the potential consequences of failure, one might argue that this threat merits the 
application of as much fiscal attention as necessary to guarantee success.  Unfortunately, 
U.S. resources are constrained and the national budget must balance the importance of 
guarding against the threat of nuclear terrorism against all other defense, social, 
international, and other demands for federal funds.  An overly simplistic recommendation 
to solve the problem by simply increasing funding across the board would likely not 
generate a proportionately greater capacity to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism.  It 
would represent an approach that fails to take into account the more important and 
necessary question of where and how to focus the application of resources.  It would also 
be fiscally irresponsible, especially in light of the current economic difficulties, to apply 
additional resources toward this threat without fully understanding where and how the 
resources should be applied to generate the most productive results.  Finally, haphazardly 
applying additional resources to comparatively strong areas of security only serves to 
highlight and increase the proportional weakness of other less well protected areas.  The 
terrorist threat is fluid and responses must be tailored and funded to meet this reality.  




the resources among programs integrated under a well-conceived and managed strategic 
umbrella represents the most pressing challenge in managing the threat of nuclear 
terrorism. 
Each preventive program plays a significant role in complementing the 
weaknesses of others and dictating the operating environment faced by the terrorists.  In 
answering the ultimate question of how to calibrate the resources applied to preventive 
programs in order to minimize and shape the threat of a domestic nuclear terrorist attack 
this research supports three main conclusions.  First, the prioritization of programmatic 
importance should recognize the primacy of domestic nuclear source-security followed 
by overseas source-security, U.S. border security and cargo screening, and finally, 
overseas reactive security measures.  Second, the comparative weakness of reactive 
security measures including U.S. border and cargo screening measures as well as other 
external transitory security programs represent a disproportionate vulnerability that must 
be acknowledged and addressed through the application of additional resources.  Third, 
the proportional distribution of resources cannot reflect a static approach to countering 
this threat.  The fluid nature of terrorist activity demands the flexibility to shift resources 
to various applications as the threat evolves and adapts to existing security measures.  In 
addition to the three main conclusions, this research provides an ancillary 
recommendation that may facilitate or enhance the application of measures taken to 
rectify the identified areas of weakness. 
A. PRIMARY CONCLUSIONS 
1. Prioritization of Threat Response Measures 
The first step in determining the proper calibration of resources must be to 
determine an order of importance among preventive efforts.  The importance of any 
preventive effort should not be minimized based solely on its ability to produce 
immediate, tangible security results.  In evaluating the utility and importance of 
individual preventive efforts, a holistic perspective is required to see the importance of 
each component within the overarching strategy.  The complexity and diversity of the  
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threat demands the application of a balanced and layered strategic approach that is fluid 
and capable of not only responding to current threats but also anticipating and preparing 
for those in the future. 
In stark contrast to conventional wisdom on the topic, this research finds that the 
security of domestic weapons and fissile materials must be afforded the highest level of 
importance.  A security breach within the domestic nuclear complex would effectively 
bypass most other layers of security, could significantly shorten the timeline for 
interdiction prior to an attack, and signal weakness to other nations with whom the U.S. is 
seeking to establish or maintain cooperative security arrangements. 
Although contrary to the opinions of most experts on the subject, overseas source 
security measures should fall second in the order of importance.  While these programs 
clearly hold current value and the potential to be exceedingly effective, they require the 
clearance of diplomatic hurdles before implementation and represent potentially 
unpredictable security means.  These programs can only be undertaken when the host 
nation agrees to accept the terms of the cooperative security arrangement until which 
time the issue remains a diplomatic rather than an implementation or appropriation 
concern.  Other factors, previously discussed, concerning the limited reliability, 
comprehensive application, and verification of these measures reduce their comparative 
threat reduction capacity.  It appears that despite the governmental and scholarly 
contention that securing overseas fissile materials should represent the first and possibly 
only focal area, it is not currently funded accordingly nor should it be.  The intersection 
of preventive programs and the risk factors associated with the terrorist nuclear threat 
demonstrate that a broad collective effort is both beneficial and necessary. 
U.S. border security and arriving cargo screening falls next in the order of 
importance.  U.S. border and port security measures are currently far from impenetrable, 
but do provide a deterrent that further complicates terrorist activity and heightens the risk 
of detection.  Despite the contention that foreign source security represents the first line 
of defense, this research calls into question the utility and reliability of this depiction.  
The notion of lines of defense suggests concentric perimeters or sequential lines that hold 
some degree of continuity and reliable defensibility.  This research has shown that while 
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useful, foreign source security and overseas border and cargo screening measures cannot 
be viewed as a reliable or comprehensive line of defense.  In protecting the U.S. from a 
domestic act of nuclear terrorism originating from an overseas location, the U.S. border 
represents the most logical boundary that could approach forming a true line of defense.  
While the U.S. border cannot currently be considered impervious, it is within the 
unilateral capacity of the U.S. to implement whatever security measures it might take to 
achieve this objective. 
Transitory security measures that fall outside the U.S. border should be 
considered last in the order of importance.  This layer of security encompasses a great 
deal of distance and space that generates both challenges and opportunities.  Distance and 
space can be viewed as an impediment that a prospective terrorist must contend with that 
can also equate to time and opportunity for defenders to detect, track, and interdict 
suspected terrorist shipments.  At the same time, space and distance increase the 
difficulties of employing any substantive or definitive screening or detection architecture.  
Certainly, overseas cargo screening and border security could play a more significant role 
in reducing the threat of a nuclear terrorist attack if resourced and implemented on a more 
aggressive scale.  Ultimately, however, this represents an area where collaborative efforts 
and strategically applied measures might be more effective in shaping the threat 
environment as opposed to attempting to achieve any sort of absolute barrier. 
While outside the scope of direct preventive efforts, RDT&E and administrative 
costs support each of the four prioritized operational areas of importance and should not 
be diminished or overlooked.  The general capacity for progress and continued 
implementation in each of the other areas rely heavily on R&D, training, and 
administrative support.  Clearly, the current screening and detection technology is not 
sufficient to consistently or reliably identify the movement of nuclear weapons or fissile 
material.  While these ancillary functions may not garner the same political support as the 
more prominent efforts, improvement of the most vulnerable aspects of the Global 
Nuclear Detection Architecture can only be rectified through a much greater political and 
fiscal emphasis on R&D efforts. 
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Having established a programmatic order of importance based upon both the 
current effectiveness and future capacity for each security approach to reduce the threat, 
the next logical step is to determine which areas require additional resources to produce 
the most significant improvements in the security environment. 
2. Calibration of Resource Prioritization and Distribution 
The prioritization of programs and focal areas does not directly prescribe how 
resources should be apportioned or recalibrated.  In this case, programs with a lower 
priority demonstrate the potential to provide the greatest degree of security improvement 
per dollar invested. 
The domestic security afforded to U.S. nuclear weapons and fissile materials is 
second to none.  While constant vigilance and continued security reviews and upgrades 
are necessary, the resources invested in this area appear sufficient.  The exceptional 
strength of security efforts in the domestic arena suggests an imbalance might exist 
among other less well resourced areas that could create vulnerabilities in the overall 
security architecture. 
Source security measures are important and beneficial but not foolproof or 
comprehensive.  Proactive overseas source-security measures are not under-funded or 
under-emphasized when systematically compared to the importance and effects of other 
elements within the protective architecture.  While the funding of overseas proactive 
source-security programs might not appear to adequately emphasize their widely 
promoted utility over reactive security or crosscutting programs, this research concludes 
that these programs receive the funding necessary to keep pace with the opportunities for 
implementation.  More diplomatic emphasis might produce additional opportunities to 
apply overseas source-security measures but until that time, efforts approved for 
implementation have been adequately resourced.  In the overseas proactive security 
arena, resources should focus on securing fissile materials where opportunities exist, with 
the utmost urgency.  The formation of a preapproved pool of resources to facilitate a 
rapid response might bypass some of the domestic political delays that could otherwise 
impede responding to a rapidly emerging opportunity. 
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The funding and urgency of U.S. border related security measures should be 
substantially increased.  Ultimately, the U.S. border represents a first and last line of 
defense against external threats.  Enhancing border security at ports, border crossings and 
remote areas would provide benefits to security across a wide range of threats including 
narcotic and human trafficking as well as that of nuclear terrorism.  Due to the inability to 
secure all sources, strengthened U.S. border security represents a crucial but 
underemphasized element in the preventive strategic framework and one entirely under 
U.S. authority to improve. 
Among the overseas reactive security programs, funding should be increased to 
aid in strengthening this strategic layer of security.  While this investment should not 
represent the highest priority, the capacity for these efforts to influence terrorist intent 
and capability is substantial.  As a compartively weak point in the Global Nuclear 
Detection Architecture, increased resources applied to both technological and 
organization improvements could aid in strengthening these capabilites and balancing 
their contribution to the overall effort to prevent acts of nuclear smuggling and terrorist 
violence. 
While not directly comparable to the aforementioned operational efforts to 
prevent a domestic nuclear terrorist attack, RDT&E, and other crosscutting programs 
represent underpinning functions that hold the potential to vastly improve the capabilties 
of the other lines of operation.  The current detection and screening shortfalls characterize 
one of the areas where the greatest need for improvement resides.  A dramatic advance in 
technology that would allow long-range or highly sensitive screening and detection could 
in itself provide the capacity to correct many of the border and cargo security concerns 
that currently diminish the effectiveness of the overall security architecture.  A significant 
increase in resources should be applied to these functions as an investment toward future 
improvements. 
3. Flexibility and Resource Apportionment 
The last conclusion serves as a qualifier for the implementation of actions 
suggested within the first two conclusions (Figure 8).  The conclusions provided herein 
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are based upon current observations of both the effectiveness of preventive programs and 
the threat depiction.  The fluid nature of both demand the ability to apply resources and 
emphasis in a flexible manner. 
In consideration of these conclusions, this research does not advocate a zero-sum 
solution.  This recommendation does not suggest a static level of funding or a fixed 
proportional distribution.  Currently, a significantly greater investment in U.S. border 
security and cargo screening reflecting the urgency and potential consequences of the 
threat are in order.  Additionally, increased emphasis on RDT&E and training represent 
other areas of critical importance for both current and future security effectiveness.  
Finally, additional resources applied to overseas reactive security programs could aid in 
filling many of the gaps that exist, promote the benefits of international cooperation, and 
bolster the deterrent effects of a broad and collaborative security apparatus. 
While commonly depicted as the single greatest threat facing the U.S., the Global 
Nuclear Detection Architecture accounts for less than .1 percent of the annual federal 
budget.276  A single B2 bomber, priced at $2.5 billion accounts for nearly as much as the 
entire Global Nuclear Detection Architecture annual appropriation.277  If the U.S. truly 
acknowledges the credibility of the threat of a domestic nuclear terrorist attack, an 
investment that reflects the gravity of this threat should be committed.  While this 
research does not support the unfocussed application of additional resources, it does 
suggest that targeted and significant funding increases in the critical areas of U.S. border 
and cargo screening and R&D represent the best solution for strengthening the 
performance of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture and improving U.S. national 
security. 
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B. ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATION TO CENTRALIZE 
MANAGEMENT 
To determine an optimal balance of funding among preventive programs, one 
must continuously reevaluate the comparative security advantages and capabilities of 
each constituent effort.  As one security measure is strengthened, another will become 
comparatively weaker.  Terrorists do not set out with the goal to fail.  They will naturally 
gravitate toward areas of weaker security and away from areas with security that is more 
stringent.  This natural tendency, to follow the path of least resistance, can work to the 
defenders advantage if each preventive effort is applied under a single, integrated, 
strategic, and authoritative framework. 
This analysis shows that no single facet of the Global Nuclear Detection 
Architecture has the capacity to prevent an act of domestic nuclear terrorism.  This reality 
forces the necessity of skillfully integrating all of the preventive programs to create a 
collective defensive strategy that imposes the greatest degree of difficulty and risk of 
interdiction upon terrorist actors.  The constituent programs within the Global Nuclear 
Detection Architecture appear to be lacking in many regards, including speed of 
implementation, total allocation of funding, and coherent strategic management of cross-
departmental efforts.  President Obama’s 2009 appointment of Gary Samore as the WMD 
Czar may hold promise for improving the integration and oversight of nuclear terrorism 
preventive programs.  However, not unlike the turmoil caused when the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) was created to integrate the IC, without 
statutory funding and staffing authority, Samore’s ability to effect change may be 
constrained.  Lessons learned from the ODNI integration, such as the lack of authority 
over the constituent agencies, should be applied to shorten the learning curve and 
expedite the process for making substantive implementation and integration changes. 
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